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I.

BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION

This article broadly identifies and then briefly examines tribal
laws that prohibit sex discrimination and secondarily addresses laws
that make sex-based distinctions. As explained below, the project is
somewhat limited in scope due to the lack of widespread availability of
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many tribes’ laws.
Specifically, this article addresses tribal equal protection guarantees as well as all types of tribal statutory and constitutional laws that
explicitly prohibit sex discrimination. It also discusses tribal case law
addressing such discrimination, including case law addressing equal
protection guarantees, cases interpreting tribal codes or policies, and
case law creating tribal common law.
A. The Indian Civil Rights Act
Any article that attempts to comprehensively explore tribal laws
that protect against discrimination based on a suspect classification
1
has to address, in some measure, the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA),
the 1968 law through which Congress imposed many Bill of Rights
2
obligations, including equal protection, on Indian tribes. This is
3
particularly true of tribal sex discrimination laws because, as explained below, the Supreme Court’s 1978 decision in Santa Clara
4
Pueblo v. Martinez led to a widespread, monolithic impression that
tribes were not protective of the rights of women.
Although the final version of the ICRA reflects important compromises between protection of the tribal right to self-government
1. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303 (2006). Federal courts have since held, in addition
to the protections imposed under the ICRA, that some federal anti-discrimination
statutes of general applicability apply to tribes, while others do not. See, e.g., Arostook
Band of Micmacs v. Ryan, 484 F.3d 41, 56 (1st Cir. 2007) (reciting the fact that tribes
are specifically excluded from the definition of “employer” under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act, but holding that particular tribe to be subject to state employment
laws); San Manuel Band of Mission Indians v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 475 F.3d
1306, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citing cases addressing the applicability of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act to tribes).
Aside from tribal enforcement of the ICRA, tribal enforcement of federal statutes
pursuant to federal law is beyond the reach of this article. Additionally, it should be
noted that Nevada v. Hicks has called into question tribal courts’ ability to hear federal
law cases other than those involving the ICRA. 533 U.S. 353, 367 (2001) (“This
historical and constitutional assumption of concurrent state-court jurisdiction over
federal-law cases is completely missing with respect to tribal courts.”).
2. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303.
3. I generally use the term “sex” rather than “gender” throughout this article
because it refers more precisely to distinctions and discrimination based on biological
sex, in other words based on being male or female. See, e.g., Lara Stemple, Male Rape
& Human Rights, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 605, 619 nn.138–39 (2009). However, as explained
infra Part I.E, my searches of sources included the word “gender,” which is
increasingly employed by legislative drafters and courts as a milder substitute for the
word “sex.”
4. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
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5

and individual rights, the initial motivation for the statute was a
perception that tribal courts were not adequately protecting the rights
6
of individual Indians. Ten years after the Act was passed, in Santa
7
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, the Supreme Court concluded that the civil
rights obligations that the ICRA imposed on tribes could not be
enforced via a private right of action in federal court, except through
the limited remedy of habeas corpus. As explained further below,
although the decision was a strong victory for tribal sovereignty, it also
arguably had the unintended effect of fueling both prejudice against
8
tribal courts and future judicial incursions on tribal sovereignty.
B. The Supreme Court’s Decision in Santa Clara v. Martinez
Martinez was a sex-based equal protection case brought under the
ICRA. The plaintiff in Martinez was a mother whose daughters could
not be enrolled in the Tribe under current tribal enrollment
provisions, which allowed enrollment of children whose fathers had
married outside the Tribe but not children whose mothers had
9
married nonmembers. The Supreme Court’s decision meant that
Ms. Martinez could only sue for this purported violation of the ICRA’s
10
equal protection guarantee in tribal court.
5. See, e.g., id. at 62 (“Two distinct and competing purposes are manifest in the
provisions of the ICRA: In addition to its objective of strengthening the position of
individual tribal members vis-à-vis the tribe, Congress also intended to promote the
well-established federal ‘policy of furthering Indian self-government.’” (quoting
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974))).
6. Robert J. McCarthy, Civil Rights in Tribal Courts: The Indian Bill of Rights at
Thirty Years, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 465, 469–70 (1998) (“Tempered by respect for tribal
sovereignty, growing concern for the civil rights of Native Americans led to enactment
of the ICRA following several years of hearings by the Senate Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights. The primary sponsor of the ICRA legislation was Senator Sam
Ervin of North Carolina, who had concluded that the rights of Indians were ‘seriously
jeopardized by the tribal government’s administration of justice,’ which he attributed
to ‘tribal judges’ inexperience, lack of training, and unfamiliarity with the traditions
and forms of the American legal system.’”).
7. 436 U.S. 49 (1977).
8. See, e.g., Sarah Krakoff, A Narrative of Sovereignty: Illuminating the Paradox of the
Domestic Dependent Nation, 83 OR. L. REV. 1109, 1133 (2004) (stating that some scholars
“have claimed . . . that the Santa Clara Court did tribes a disservice in the long run by
finding no private right of action in the ICRA, because the non-reviewability of tribal
decisions has led to the piecemeal divestment of tribal jurisdiction over nonIndians”).
9. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 59.
10. See id. at 59. The ICRA’s equal protection guarantee can be found at 25
U.S.C. § 1302(8) (2006).
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Martinez was decided in 1978, just a few years after the U.S. Supreme Court had begun to strike down sex-based classifications under
11
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and only
two years after the Court had adopted the intermediate scrutiny test
for sex-based classifications alleged to violate the Equal Protection
12
Clause, which it still applies today. The Supreme Court’s official
recognition that sex-based classifications are inherently suspect under
the Constitution occurred about nine years after the very first federal
ban on sex discrimination in 1967, which was in the form of an
13
Executive Order.
Although U.S. federal policy prohibiting sex discrimination was
still in its early stages when Martinez was decided, the outcry against
the Martinez case by mainstream feminists and other advocates of
14
individual rights was extensive and has been well-documented. In
fact, feminist “discontent with the decision continues to fuel discourse
about gender equality and whether tribal law should be force-fit into
15
an external norm.” In contrast, proponents of the decision point to
the important cultural values and traditions that the decision supports
16
and protects. Additionally, some Native scholars and commentators
argue that sex-based oppression in tribal cultures derives from
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); see, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971) (holding that an Idaho statute preferring males to administer estates violated
the Fourteenth Amendment).
12. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), represents the Court’s first application
of the intermediate scrutiny standard for sex-based classifications. See, e.g., Brian
Johnson, Admitting that Women’s Only Public Education is Unconstitutional and Advancing
the Equality of the Sexes, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 53, 62–63 (2002) (describing Craig v.
Boren and other early cases). The standard was applied most recently by the Supreme
Court in Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
13. See, e.g., Rebecca A. Kiselewich, Note, In Defense of the 2006 Title IX Regulations
for Single-Sex Public Education: How Separate Can Be Equal, 49 B.C. L. REV. 217, 221
(2008) (“[O]n October 13, 1967, President Lyndon B. Johnson amended his
Executive Order No. 11,246 to include the first prohibition of discrimination on the
basis of sex.”).
14. See, e.g., Gloria Valencia-Weber, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez: Twenty-Five
Years of Disparate Cultural Visions: An Essay Introducing the Case for Reargument Before the
American Indian Nations Supreme Court, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 49, 50, 53–54 (2004);
see generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, Whose Culture? A Case Note on Martinez v. Santa
Clara Pueblo (1983), in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE & LAW 63–69
(1987).
15. Valencia-Weber, supra note 14, at 53.
16. Id. at 54–57; see generally Rina Swentzell, Testimony of a Santa Clara Woman, 14
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 97 (2004) (discussing how the Martinez decision acknowledged
a way of life which traditionally honored nurturing and feminine qualities).
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Western colonial influences and that it stems from the hierarchical
nature of Western society and its valuing of all opposites as good or
18
bad. Indeed, it appears that, in Santa Clara society, gender was
19
traditionally—and to some extent still is —a mutable concept.
Rather than further exploring this dichotomy between those who
bemoan the decision and those who applaud it, however, this article
examines how tribal laws approach sex-based categorizations,
particularly focusing on tribal prohibitions of sex discrimination.

17. ANDREA SMITH, CONQUEST: SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND AMERICAN INDIAN GENOCIDE
18, 139 (2005) (describing Native societies in the colonial period as “more . . .
egalitarian” than those of the colonizers, noting that “[i]n contrast to the deeply
patriarchal nature of European societies, prior to colonization, Indian societies for
the most part were not male-dominated,” and arguing that “[i]t has been through
sexual violence and through the imposition of European gender relationships on
Native communities that Europeans were able to colonize Native peoples in the first
place”); Swentzell, supra note 16, at 99, 101 (suggesting that the sex-based membership provision at Santa Clara Pueblo resulted from non-Indian attorneys’ drafting the
Tribe’s constitution and describing sex-based oppression generally as a concept that
was foreign to the traditional Santa Clara worldview); accord Madhavi Sunder, Piercing
the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399, 1430 n.158, 1463 n.324 (2003) (describing how Canada’s
Indian Act imposed patriarchal membership criteria on matrilineal indigenous
cultures).
18. Swentzell, supra note 16, at 98, 101; see also SMITH, supra note 17, at 18
(stating that, in Indian societies prior to colonization, “[a]lthough there existed a
division of labor between women and men, women’s labor and men’s labor was
accorded similar status”).
19. Swentzell, supra note 16, at 98. As Ms. Swentzell explains:
At Santa Clara Pueblo, the social order was not traditionally either/or,
not matriarchical or patriarchical. It was both. Even today, every child is
born as a Winter person or a Summer person with the option to become the
other if the sensibilities are of the other. To know and acknowledge both is
encouraged, because ultimately, the goal is to embrace the whole . . . . It is
believed that every person has feminine and masculine, warm and cold,
dark and light qualities. And, living is about acknowledging the other, the
opposite, and balancing those forces within us and within our human society . . . . At Santa Clara, the ideal person was and still is the gia. Earth, who
gave the people birth is called gia, so is the biological woman who gives
birth, and so are the community women who nurture and take care of many
extended families. They give ceremonial or political advice, physical shelter
and food, if needed, and housing. Most unusual is that men in the community who behave as nurturing, embracing people in the political and ceremonial realms are also called, gias, that is, mothers. The best way to behave
in that world is as a mother . . . .
Id. For a discussion of another tribe’s view of gender as a mutable concept, see WILL
ROSCOE, THE ZUNI MAN-WOMAN 22 (1st ed. 1991) (“While the traditional roles of men
and women were well-defined, the Zunis viewed gender as an acquired rather than an
inborn trait. Biological sex did not dictate the roles individuals assumed.”).
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20

Scant scholarly attention has been devoted to analysis of tribal law,
and this lack of analysis undoubtedly contributes to federal courts’
and other outsiders’ misconceptions and prejudice with respect to
21
tribal systems of governance and tribal laws. Indeed, the outcry
against Martinez can be understood as part of a widespread mistrust of
22
tribal justice systems generally.
Thus, this article attempts to begin to set the record straight
about tribal laws in the specific area of sex discrimination. Tribal laws
prohibiting sex discrimination (and those few tribal laws providing for
sex-based distinctions) illuminate the diverse approaches that tribes
take toward the concept of sex-based equal protection and sex
23
discrimination. Accordingly, this article undertakes a broad-based
survey of tribal laws that pertain to sex-based classifications.
C. Organization of the Article
The most important part of this article, Part II, contains the survey of tribal sex discrimination laws. The survey begins with broader
laws and proceeds to more specific or narrower laws. A second,
subsidiary organizing principle within this framework is the number
20. Robert D. Cooter & Wolfgang Fikentscher, American Indian Law Codes:
Pragmatic Law & Tribal Identity, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 29, 30 (2008).
21. See, e.g., McCarthy, supra note 6, at 468, 485–89 (examining federal Indian
policy developed through acts of Congress and judicial decisions from 1960 to the
present day).
22. See, e.g., Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty
Indian Tribal Courts, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 285, 285–87 (1998) (describing the
incorrect general mistrust of tribal justice systems by the public and the Federal
Government); see also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court’s Legal Culture War
Against Tribal Law, 2 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 93, 106 (2006) (describing
Justice Souter’s concern that tribal law is “‘unusually difficult for an outsider to sort
out’” and his implicit belief that “substantive tribal law is unknown and even
unknowable by outsiders”) (quoting Nevada v. Hicks, 553 U.S. 333, 384–85 (2001)
(Souter, J., concurring)); Ann E. Tweedy, Connecting the Dots Between the Constitution,
the Marshall Trilogy, and United States v. Lara: Notes Toward a Blueprint for the Next
Legislative Restoration of Tribal Sovereignty, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 651, 685–86, n.163
(2009) (describing how prejudice against tribal courts both drives and results from
judicial divestment of tribal sovereignty).
23. Tribes take diverse approaches to their ICRA obligations based on tribal
needs, values, customs, and traditions; accordingly, ICRA-based rights under tribal law
do not necessarily mirror the corresponding protections under federal law. Mark D.
Rosen, Multiple Authoritative Interpreters of Quasi-Constitutional Federal Law: Tribal Courts
& the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 479, 487 (2000). Additionally, of
course, tribal guarantees of equality and tribal prohibitions on sex discrimination that
are not related to the ICRA may well be interpreted differently than would similar
provisions under federal law. See id. at 487–89.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2010

7

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 5
2. Tweedy.docx

2010]

1/22/2010 3:13 PM

SEX DISCRIMINATION UNDER TRIBAL LAW

399

of tribes that have enacted a given type of law. Thus, a specific type of
broad law (e.g., employment discrimination) that has been enacted by
five tribes would be examined before another type of equally broad
law that has been enacted by only one tribe (e.g., public accommodations). Equal protection guarantees, the broadest type of law
examined here, are addressed first.
Part II first examines equal protection guarantees and similar
24
provisions, paying close attention to the limited tribal court case law
interpreting equal protection guarantees in the context of sex
25
discrimination claims. Secondly, this Part examines explicit steps
tribes have taken to protect those within their jurisdictions from sex
discrimination. These protections range from the Navajo Nation’s
broad-based protection in Title 1, section 3 of the Navajo Nation Bill
26
of Rights, which exceeds the protections available under existing
27
federal law and which has been interpreted by Navajo Courts to
24. Many tribes include an equal protection guarantee in their constitutions.
See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF THE COQUILLE INDIAN TRIBE, ART. VI, § 3(b)(11), available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/coquille_const.htm; CONSTITUTION
OF THE SAC & FOX NATION, ART. X, § 8, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter
.org/ccfolder1/sac_fox_const.htm; CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE SAULT STE.
MARIE TRIBE OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS, ART. VIII, available at http://www.tribalresource
center.org/ccfolder1/sault_chippewa_constandbylaws.htm. Such constitutional
guarantees may pre-date the ICRA and thus may be unrelated to it. See Cooter &
Fikentscher, supra note 20, at 31 (noting that some tribal governments enacted tribal
constitutions immediately after passage of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934). At
least some of these pre-ICRA constitutions included some form of an equal protection
guarantee. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL
COMMUNITY, art. VII, § 2 (preserving “equal economic opportunities” for all
members), available at http://www.swinomish.org/departments/tribal_attorney/
tribal_code/pretitle%201/ constitutionbylaws.pdf. This section was included in the
original constitution passed in 1935. See id. (documenting legislative history).
Additionally, even equal protection guarantees that came into effect after the ICRA
may not be related to the ICRA, and a lack of detailed legislative history often makes
it impossible to tell.
25. Although the published tribal court cases construing the ICRA are by no
means numerous, for example, see McCarthy, supra note 6, at 491, a few such cases
are available that address sex discrimination claims. Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v.
Bigfire, 24 Indian L. Rptr. 6232 (Winnebago Tribal Ct. 1997), aff’d 25 Indian L. Rptr.
6229 (Winnebago Sup. Ct. 1998); Griffith v. Wilkie, 18 Indian L. Rptr. 6058
(Northern Plains Intertribal Ct. App. 1991); see also Rosen, supra note 23, at 541
(discussing the Winnebago Supreme Court’s opinion in Bigfire as well as two earlier
Winnebago equal protection cases relating to sex discrimination).
26. NAVAJO NATION BILL OF RIGHTS tit. 1, § 3 (2008) (“Equality of rights under
the law shall not be denied or abridged by the Navajo Nation on account of sex
. . . .”).
27. See Krakoff, supra note 8, at 1138 (discussing how the Navajo Nation has
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28

protect both men and women, to the more common, contextspecific code protections such as section 95-13(c) of the Eastern Band
of Cherokee Indians’ Wages/Employment Rights Code, which
provides that “[n]o covered employer shall discriminate against any
29
employee on the basis of gender.”
Tribal court case law that
interprets specific code or policy provisions, or bars sex discrimination as a matter of common law, is also examined.
Part III briefly analyzes the identified tribal laws that create sexbased distinctions. Part IV looks at the impact of tribal sovereign
immunity laws on the enforceability of protections against sex
discrimination. Part V addresses the possibility that potential sex
discrimination plaintiffs may be pursuing other avenues of relief in
tribal courts and tribal agencies. Finally, Part VI concludes that a
significant percentage of tribes appear to have adopted laws or
policies prohibiting sex discrimination.
The goal of this survey of existing tribal protections against sex
discrimination is to illuminate the positive, and often innovative, steps
that tribes have taken to eliminate sex discrimination within their
jurisdictions, while remaining realistic about the fact that such
30
protections are not available in the case of every tribe. Given the
31
inherent difficulty of researching tribal law, it is hoped that this
article will serve as a useful starting point for practitioners, scholars,
and state and federal court personnel seeking to understand tribal
approaches toward sex discrimination.

enacted laws that protect individual rights and liberties, some of which exceed the
protections in the U.S. Constitution).
28. See Help v. Silvers a.k.a. Silver Fox, No. A-CV-01-82, ¶¶ 31–34 (Navajo May 6,
1983) (holding that the proper analysis of the Navajo Equal Rights guarantee is that
there can be no legal result on account of a person’s sex), available at
http://www.tribal-institute.org/opinions/ 1983.NANN.0000001.htm.
29. CHEROKEE CODE art. II, § 95-13(c), available at http://www.tribal
resourcecenter.org/ccfolder/ eccodetoc.htm. These context-specific protections can
be found in a wide range of subject areas where explicit protections would not
typically be found under federal or state law. See, e.g., SISSETON-WAHPETON SIOUX
TRIBE CODE, ch. 31, § 31-01-01, available at http://www.ntjrc.org/ccfolder/
sisseton_wahpeton_codeoflaw31.htm (prohibiting disparate treatment of prisoners
based on sex and other grounds).
30. See, e.g., Valencia-Weber, supra note 14, at 50, 59 (noting that the enrollment
ordinance at issue in Santa Clara Pueblo is still in place, but explaining that the
ordinance serves important tribal interests).
31. See, e.g., Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 20, at 32–35 (describing the
research process and the difficulty in studying various tribal codes, including the
idiosyncrasies present in some tribes’ recording methods).
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D. Methodology
The sources relied on include the tribal codes, constitutions, and
cases available online from the National Tribal Justice Resource
Center, cases included in the Indian Law Reporter from 1983 through
32
early 2008, the University of Washington’s 1988 microfiche compilation of tribal codes and constitutions, the decisions of the Northwest
Intertribal Courts, the limited tribal law resources available on
Westlaw, and, occasionally, legal resources downloaded from the
websites of individual tribes and obtained from other miscellaneous
sources.
Researching tribal law is inherently difficult, and it is literally impossible without visiting each tribe’s reservation to ensure that one
has the most recent and comprehensive set of tribal laws available
33
from each tribe. While tribal cases are generally more difficult to
34
obtain than tribal codes, which are equivalent to tribal statutory law,
obtaining a complete version of either source from a given tribe is
likely to be somewhat difficult because “tribal officials seldom
circulate their laws outside the reservation and tribal judges seldom
35
document their decisions in writings that outsiders can access.”
Indeed, in most cases, the particular sources I relied on did not
purport to be comprehensive even as to the tribes whose laws were
included. For example, the Indian Law Reporter, which exists solely
in hard copy format, is the “only national reporter of tribal court
36
decisions.” However, it does not publish all of the tribal court
decisions submitted to it, typically publishing about “one hundred
37
decisions per year that come from about twenty-five tribes.”
32. 1983 was the first year that the Indian Law Reporter included tribal court
decisions. David A. Castleman, Personal Jurisdiction in Tribal Courts, 154 U. PA. L. REV.
1253, 1254 (2006).
33. See Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 20, at 32–34 (explaining the difficulty of
researching tribal law).
34. See The Honorable Korey Wahwassuck, The New Face of Tribal Justice: Joint
Tribal-State Jurisdiction, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 733, 739 (2008) (“[R]elatively few tribal
courts keep records of their proceedings, and of those that do, even fewer publish
those opinions in the Indian Law Reporter”); Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 20, at
34–35.
35. Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 20, at 31.
36. Frank Pommersheim, Looking Forward and Looking Back: The Promise and
Potential of a Sioux Nation Judicial Support Center and Sioux Nation Supreme Court, 34 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 269, 275 (2002).
37. Rosen, supra note 23, at 510; accord Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 20, at 35
(describing the Indian Law Reporter as “collect[ing] a small number of cases from

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol36/iss2/5

10

Tweedy: Sex Discrimination under Tribal Law
2. Tweedy.docx

402

1/22/2010 3:13 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:2

Moreover, some of the Indian Law Reporter volumes I used have
missing pages, and the Indian Law Reporter also has irregular
indexing over time, which made it difficult to ensure consistency.
Similarly, the 1988 microfiche compilation contains codes and
constitutions from only fifty-six tribes and is not only now out-of-date,
but is also incomplete even with respect to the tribes who are
38
represented. Additionally, visual searching of microfiche tends to be
an inexact science, and my search of the microfiche was primarily
limited to provisions explicitly mentioning “sex” or “gender.”
Finally, the National Tribal Justice Resource Center does not guarantee that its sources are up-to-date or comprehensive with respect to
39
the tribes that are included, and I identified a couple of instances in
which codes or constitutional provisions provided on the site were in
40
fact not currently in place. Thus, because of the virtual impossibility
of conducting an all-inclusive survey, this article provides a snapshot
of numerous tribal approaches to sex as a classification in the hopes
of facilitating greater understanding of the diverse ways that tribes
approach the issue of sex discrimination and the significant protections that many tribes afford against it.
The most comprehensive portion of this survey was my search of
the online tribal codes and constitutions available on the National
Tribal Justice Resource Center site. On that site, I examined all the
hits for the following terms: “sex,” “gender,” “equal protection”
(with quotes), “male,” “female,” “father,” “mother,” “sexual
harassment” (with quotes), and “sexually harass” (without quotes).
During the period of my searches in August 2008, the National Tribal
Justice Resource Center webpage stated that it had archived on its site
41
the codes and resolutions of 69 tribes and the constitutions and
42
bylaws of 116 tribes. Despite the potential incompleteness of this
reservations throughout the United States”).
38. Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 20, at 33.
39. See id. (noting that online collections, such as that of the National Tribal
Justice Resource Center, are not yet “close to complete” and that “[t]o gain access to
a complete set of codes for a tribe, one must go to reservations and speak to
officials”).
40. See infra notes 45 and 102.
41. See National Tribal Justice Resource Center, Directory of Tribal Codes and
Tribal Resolutions, http://www.ntjrc.org/triballaw/codesdirectory.asp (last visited
Aug. 18, 2008).
42. See National Tribal Justice Resource Center, Directory of Tribal Constitutions
and By-Laws, http://www.ntjrc.org/triballaw/constdirectory.asp (last visited Aug. 18,
2008).
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resource, the percentages of tribes that had particular types of sex
discrimination laws in place are provided, usually in the footnotes to
the discussions of such laws.
In fall 2008, additional tribal law resources became available on
Westlaw (although still of very limited scope). Thus, in late January
and in February 2009, I ran the following search in the Westlaw Tribal
Cases and the Tribal Codes and Indexes databases: “sex gender ‘equal
protection’ male female father mother ‘sexual harassment’ ‘sexually
harass.’” During this time period, Westlaw had cases from ten tribes
online as well as a somewhat overlapping database of Oklahoma tribal
decisions. Additionally, it had the tribal codes of two tribes, the
Navajo Nation and the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, in its tribal codes
database. In many instances, materials found through Westlaw had
already been identified through earlier searches of other resources.
However, any newly discovered sex discrimination materials were
added to the article at that point.
II. TRIBAL SEX DISCRIMINATION LAWS
At the outset it should be noted that whether or not a tribal code
or constitution protects against sex discrimination is not determinative of whether its tribal court would recognize such a claim. Even in
the absence of a code provision or constitutional provision that
prohibits sex discrimination, either explicitly or implicitly, a tribal
court may hold such conduct to be actionable as a matter of common
43
law.

43. See, e.g., Michael Taylor, Modern Practice in Indian Courts, 10 U. PUGET SOUND
L. REV. 231, 239 (1986–87) (“The lack of a code provision in a specific area does not
mean that the tribal court may not exercise inherent jurisdiction in that area of the
law.”); see also Bank of Hoven v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., No. 03-002-A/R-12099, slip op. at 6–9 (Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal App. Ct., Nov. 24, 2004), available at
http://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2007/12/tribal-coa-opinion-bank-of-hoven.pdf
(recognizing a race discrimination claim under tribal common law), aff’d, Plains
Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 440 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (D.S.D.
2006), aff’d, 491 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 2007), rev’d on other grounds, 128 S. Ct. 2709 (2008);
Hoopa Forest Industries v. Jordan, 25 Indian L. Rptr. 6159, 6160 & n.1 (Hoopa Valley
Tribal Ct. 1998) (reversing a tribal agency’s determination that the employer was
liable for sexual harassment based upon the facts that the agency had not entered
findings of fact and conclusions of law, that the agency had relied on an exhibit that
was not in the record, and that the conduct at issue did not rise to the level of severity
required under federal standards, which the court appeared to be using in an
advisory capacity despite the statement in tribal personnel policies that only an
individual harasser could be held liable for sexual harassment).
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A. Equal Protection and Related Guarantees
Numerous tribal laws provide equal protection guarantees that,
like the language in the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, generally provide that the tribe “will not deny to any person
44
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws.” Many such
45
laws are part of tribal constitutions while others have been enacted
44. CONSTITUTION OF THE STANDING ROCK SIOUX TRIBE, art. XI, § 8, microformed on
Indian Tribal Codes: A Microfiche Collection of Indian Law Codes (Ralph Johnson
ed. 1988).
45. CONSTITUTION OF THE CITIZEN POTAWATOMI NATION, art. 16, § 1(h), available
at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/potawatomi_nation_const.htm;
CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE COLORADO RIVER INDIAN TRIBES OF THE COLORADO
RIVER INDIAN RESERVATION ARIZONA AND CALIFORNIA, art. III, § 3, microformed on Indian
Tribal Codes: A Microfiche Collection of Indian Law Codes (Ralph Johnson ed.
1988); CONSTITUTION OF THE COQUILLE INDIAN TRIBE, art. VI, § 3(b)(11), available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/coquille_const.htm; CROW TRIBAL
CONSTITUTION, art. XI, § 4(h), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/
ccfolder1/crow_const.htm; CONSTITUTION OF THE DUCKWATER SHOSHONE TRIBE OF THE
DUCKWATER RESERVATION, NEVADA, art. IV, § 2(h), available at http://www
.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/duckwater_shoshone_const.htm; CONSTITUTION
& BYLAWS OF THE ELY SHOSHONE TRIBE, art. VIII, §§ 1, 2(h), available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/ely_shoshone_const.htm; CONSTITUTION & BY-LAWS OF THE CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE GRAND RONDE COMMUNITY OF
OREGON, art. III, § 3(k), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/
grand_ronde_constandbylaws.htm; CONSTITUTION OF THE GRAND TRAVERSE BAND OF
OTTAWA AND CHIPPEWA INDIANS, art. X, § 1(h), available at http://www
.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/grand_traverse_const.htm; CONSTITUTION OF THE
HO-CHUNK NATION, art. X, § 1(a)(8), available at http://www.tribalresource
center.org/ccfolder1/hochunk_const.htm; CONSTITUTION OF THE NATIVE TRIBE OF
HUSLIA, ALASKA, art. 12, § 3(8), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter
.org/ccfolder1/huslia_al_const.htm; CONSTITUTION OF THE KICKAPOO TRADITIONAL
TRIBE OF TEXAS, art. X, § 2(h), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter
.org/ccfolder1/kickapoo_const.htm; CONSTITUTION OF THE NATIVE TRIBE OF KOYUKUK,
ALASKA, art. 11, § 3(8), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/
koyukuk_al_const.htm; LITTLE RIVER BAND OF OTTAWA INDIANS CONSTITUTION, art. III,
§ 1(h), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/little_river_
const.htm; REVISED CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE MINNESOTA CHIPPEWA TRIBE, art.
XIII, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/chippewa_constand
bylaws.htm; CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE MISSISSIPPI BAND OF CHOCTAW INDIANS,
art. X, § 1(h), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/mississippi_
choctaw_const.htm; CONSTITUTION OF THE SIPAYIK MEMBERS OF THE PASAMAQUODDY
TRIBE, art. IV, § 1(h), available at http://www.wabanaki.com/tribal_constitution.htm;
CONSTITUTION & BYLAWS OF THE ROSEBUD SIOUX TRIBE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, art. X, § 3,
available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/rosebudconst.htm; CONSTITUTION OF THE SAC & FOX NATION, art. X, § 8, available at http://www.tribal
resourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/sac_fox_const.htm; SALISH & KOOTENAI CONSTITUTION
& BYLAWS CODIFIED, app., available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/
salishandkootenai_constandbylaws.htm (explicitly incorporating and setting forth the
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Still other tribes have enacted equal

text of the ICRA, including its equal protection guarantee); CONSTITUTION & BYLAWS
OF THE SAULT STE. MARIE TRIBE OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS, art. VIII, available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/sault_chippewa_constandbylaws.htm;
CONSTITUTION OF THE SKOKOMISH INDIAN TRIBE [AND RELATED DOCUMENTS], art. IX,
available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/skokomish_const.htm;
SAINT REGIS MOHAWK TRIBE CONSTITUTION, art. IV, § 1(h), available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/saint_regis_mohawk_const.htm;
CONSTITUTION OF THE STANDING ROCK SIOUX TRIBE, art. XI, § 8 microformed on Indian
Tribal Codes: A Microfiche Collection of Indian Law Codes (Ralph Johnson ed.
1988); CONSTITUTION OF THE TORRES MARTINEZ DESERT CAHUILLA INDIANS TORRES
MARTINEZ RESERVATION, CALIFORNIA, art. V, § 1(H), available at http://www.tribal
resourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/torresconst.htm; CONSTITUTION & BYLAWS OF THE
TURTLE MOUNTAIN BAND OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS, art. XIV, § 3, available at
http://www.tmbci.net/PDF/Constitution.pdf (judiciary to ensure “equal
protection”); CONSTITUTION OF THE WAMPANOAG TRIBE OF GAY HEAD (AQUINNAH), art.
III, § 1(d), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/wampanoag_
const.htm; CONSTITUTION OF THE YAVAPAI-APACHE NATION, art. IX, § (h), available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/yavapai_apache_const.html; CONSTITUTION OF THE FORT MCDOWELL YAVAPAI NATION, art. VIII, § 1(H), available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/yavapai_ftmcdowell_const.htm.
Thus, roughly twenty percent of the tribal constitutions available on the
National Tribal Justice Resource Center site had equal protection clauses. See supra
Part I.E. (explaining that 116 tribal constitutions and bylaws were archived on the
National Tribal Justice Resource Center site during the relevant period). Note that
the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians’ constitution was available online on
the National Tribal Justice Resource Center website but that another of that Tribe’s
documents downloaded from the National Tribal Justice Resource Center appeared
to be out-of-date, so I downloaded the constitution from the Tribe’s own website to
ensure I had the most current version. See infra note 102. Because the Turtle
Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians’ Constitution was available on the National
Tribal Justice Resource Center website, I included it in the count of tribal constitutions available from that website and also included its equal protection clause in the
calculation of the number of tribes having such clauses. Similarly, the Pasamaquoddy
Constitution was designated a draft on the National Tribal Justice Resource Center
site, so I downloaded the version from that tribe’s own website. Likewise, the Hopi
Constitution on the National Tribal Justice Resource Center site has both an equal
protection clause and an explicit, broad-based prohibition on sex-discrimination,
CONSTITUTION OF THE HOPI TRIBE, art. IX, § 1(i), available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/hopi_const.htm, but it appears to be
an unapproved draft, based on information communicated by the Hopi Tribal
Secretary’s Office. Personal Communication with Hopi Tribal Secretary’s Office
(Oct. 1, 2008); see also CONSTITUTION & BY-LAWS OF THE HOPI TRIBE, art. IX, § 1 (1993),
available at http://hopicourts.com/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=50&
group=13. Therefore, the Hopi provision from the Tribal Justice Resource Center
was not counted, although the Pasamaquoddy Tribe’s Constitution was counted.
46. See Colville Tribal Civil Rights Act, ch.1–5, § 1-5-2(h), available at http://
www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/colville_lawandorder_CHPT1-5.html; CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE COOS, LOWER UMPQUA AND SIUSLAW INDIANS TRIBAL CODE, tit.
I, ch. 1–5, § 1-5-1(g), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/
coos_umpqua_siuslaw_tribalcode_1_5.htm; MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT TRIBAL LAWS, tit.
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protection guarantees, or other guarantees of equality, that apply in
47
specialized circumstances. These context-specific protections may
48
be in addition to general equal protection guarantees or they may
49
Finally, some tribes have expressly adopted the
stand alone.
XX, ch. 1, § 1(a)(8), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/
masht20.htm; STATUTES OF THE NON-REMOVABLE MILLE LACS BAND OF CHIPPEWA
INDIANS, BAND STATUTE 1011-MCL-5, § 8; SISSETON, S.D., ORDINANCE No.79-02 (1979),
available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/sisseton_wahpeton_
codeoflaw20.htm (stating that judiciary of the tribe is to provide “equal protection
and justice” pursuant to the Indian Civil Rights Act).
47. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE COLORADO RIVER INDIAN TRIBES OF
THE COLORADO RIVER INDIAN RESERVATION ARIZONA AND CALIFORNIA, art. III, § 3,
microformed on Indian Tribal Codes: A Microfiche Collection of Indian Law Codes
(Ralph Johnson ed. 1988) (providing for “equal political rights and equal
opportunity to participate in the economic resources and activities of the tribes” in
addition to equal protection); NISQUALLY TRIBAL CODE, tit. 38, § 38-01-03, available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/nisqcode38.htm (“no person shall
be denied the equal protection of the terms of” the sub-chapter pertaining to tobacco
revenue taxation); CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE SILETZ INDIANS, OR., STANDING COMMITTEE ORDINANCE 84-06, § 4 (1999), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter
.org/ccfolder1/silcode6standcommord.htm (“Committee Members may also be
removed for cause following a hearing before the Tribal Council, which provides
applicable standards of due process and equal protection.”); id. § 12 (“The Tribal
Chairman shall attempt to ensure that all members of the Siletz Tribe have an equal
opportunity to serve on committees . . . .”); CONSTITUTION OF THE WAMPANOAG TRIBE
OF GAY HEAD (AQUINNAH), art. III, § 3(b), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter
.org/ccfolder1/wampanoag_const.htm (requiring the Tribal Council to “[e]nsure
that tribal members have free access to the clay in the cliffs on an equal basis
provided that such access is subject to reasonable regulation in order to protect and
preserve the resource”).
Some of the guarantees that are phrased somewhat differently than an
ordinary “equal protection” guarantee may in fact be just as broad as the concept of
equal protection. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION & BY-LAWS OF THE HOPI TRIBE, art. IX, § 1
(1993), available at http://hopicourts.com/index.php?option=com_docman&
Itemid=50&group=13 (providing for “[a]ll resident members of the Tribe [to] . . . be
given equal opportunities to share in the economic resources and activities of the
jurisdiction”).
48. See, e.g., STANDING ROCK SIOUX CODE OF JUSTICE, tit. XVIII, ch. 1, § 18-102(c)
(“compensation for work will be based on the principles of equal pay for equal
work.”), microformed on Indian Tribal Codes: A Microfiche Collection of Indian Law
Codes (Ralph Johnson ed. 1988); see also CONSTITUTION OF THE STANDING ROCK SIOUX
TRIBE, art. XI, § 8, microformed on Indian Tribal Codes: A Microfiche Collection of
Indian Law Codes (Ralph Johnson ed. 1988) (providing general Equal Protection
guarantee).
49. For example, nothing in the Nisqually Tribe’s constitution or code, assuming
the complete version is available on the National Tribal Justice Resource Center
website, appears to provide for “equal protection” except for the provision relating to
tobacco revenue taxation. NISQUALLY TRIBAL CODE, tit. 38, § 38-01-03, available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/nisqcode38.htm (“no person shall
be denied the equal protection of the terms of” the sub-chapter pertaining to tobacco
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provisions of the ICRA as a matter of tribal law, and, to the extent any
of these tribes lack separate equal protection guarantees, they should
be viewed to have such guarantees in place, based on the terms of the
50
ICRA.
Without tribal court case law on point, however, it is difficult to
know how a particular tribe would apply such equal protection
guarantees in the context of a sex discrimination claim and whether,
even if the tribal court followed the federal model of differing levels
of scrutiny for different types of classifications, it would apply
51
heightened scrutiny to a sex-based classification. This is because
revenue taxation). However, the Tribe’s constitution does provide for “[a]ll
members of the Tribe . . . [to] be accorded equal opportunities to participate in the
economic resources and activities of the Tribe.” CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE
NISQUALLY TRIBE OF THE NISQUALLY INDIAN RESERVATION, art. VII, § 2, available at
http://www.ntjrc.org/ccfolder/nisqconst.htm.
50. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF THE COQUILLE INDIAN TRIBE, art. VI, § 3(b)(11),
available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/coquille_const.htm
(“The Tribal Council and other officials of the Tribe shall not deny to any person the
equal protection of tribal laws . . . . The Tribe shall provide to all persons within its
jurisdiction the rights guaranteed by the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.”);
CONSTITUTION & BY-LAWS OF THE CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE GRAND RONDE
COMMUNITY OF OREGON, art. III, §3(k), available at http://www.tribal
resourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/grand_ronde_constandbylaws.htm (“The Tribal
Council shall not deny to any person the equal protection of tribal laws . . . . The
Tribe shall provide to all persons within its jurisdiction the rights guaranteed by the
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.”); SAN ILDEFONSO PUEBLO CODE, tit. XVIII, ch. 57, § 573, available at http://www.narf.org/nill/Codes/sicode/sanildcodet18consumer.htm#
chapter57 (“Any person who has probable cause to believe that his or her civil rights
guaranteed by the Indian Civil Rights Act of April 11, 1968, PL 90-284 (82 Stat. 77) or
by the traditions and customs of the Pueblo, [sic] may file a complaint with the
Tribal Court pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure set forth in this Code.”); SALISH
& KOOTENAI CONSTITUTION & BYLAWS CODIFIED, APPENDIX, available at http://www
.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/salishandkootenai_constandbylaws.htm (explicitly incorporating and setting forth the text of the ICRA, including its equal
protection guarantee); CONSTITUTION OF THE SKOKOMISH INDIAN TRIBE [AND RELATED
DOCUMENTS], art. IX, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/
skokomish_const.htm (“The tribal government shall not deny to any person the
equal protection of tribal laws . . . . The tribe shall provide to all persons within its
jurisdiction the rights guaranteed by the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.”);
CONSTITUTION & BYLAWS OF THE TURTLE MOUNTAIN BAND OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS, art.
XIV, § 3, available at http://www.tmbci.net/PDF/Constitution.pdf (judiciary to
ensure “equal protection” and “protection of rights arising under the Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1968, as amended”).
51. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 23, at 487–88, 511; Taylor, supra note 43, at 255–
57 (suggesting that this potential for diverse interpretations of rights based on tribal
cultural norms furthers tribal sovereignty and allows individual tribal cultures to
flourish and that forced standardization of rights would threaten the viability of tribal
cultures as unique institutions); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Employment Separation:
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tribal “needs, values, customs, and traditions” play an important role
52
in tribal interpretation of civil rights guarantees, regardless of
53
whether a litigant is proceeding under tribal law or the ICRA.
Therefore, especially with regard to a facially sex-neutral guarantee
like “equal protection,” tribal court case law, where available, is an
54
enormously important resource.
For most of the tribal laws cited above, I was unable to locate tribal court case law construing the equal protection guarantee in the
context of a sex discrimination case. However, the Northern Plains
Intertribal Court of Appeals has considered the scope of the ICRA’s
equal protection guarantee in the context of a custody dispute, and
that court invalidated a family law provision of the Turtle Mountain
Tribal Law Enigma, Tribal Governance Paradox, and Tribal Court Conundrum, 38 MICH.
J.L. REFORM 273, 273–74 (2005) (“External rules and interpretations . . . would
destroy the unique traditional, cultural and community attributes of tribal communities . . . [and] would destroy the diversity that exists among the many tribal
communities themselves. The essence of sovereignty is the right of the people of a
nation to decide what their body of jurisprudence shall be.”) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Krakoff, supra note 8, at 1153 (describing Navajo
officials’ view that “sovereignty and [the] survival of the Navajo people” are linked
and quoting Navajo Nation Legislative Counsel Raymond Etcitty’s complaint that
tribes are not looked upon as “laboratories of democracy”).
52. Rosen, supra note 23, at 487; see also Colville Confederated Tribes v. Bearcub,
35 Indian L. Rptr. 6011, 6012 (Confederated Tribes of the Colville Tribal Ct. 2005)
(explaining tribe’s right to interpret free speech rights differently under the ICRA
than a federal court would under the U.S. Constitution).
53. Rosen, supra note 23, at 511; Taylor, supra note 43, at 239, 255–56; see also
Winnebego Tribe of Nebraska v. Bigfire, 25 Indian L. Rptr. 6229, 6230 (Winnebago
Sup. Ct. 1998); accord Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Bigfire, 24 Indian L. Rptr.
6232, 6235–36 (Winnebago Tribal Ct. 1997), aff’d 25 Indian L. Rptr. 6229 (Winnebago Sup. Ct. 1998); Fletcher, supra note 51, at 273–74. However, the Winnebago
Supreme Court in Bigfire suggested that its analysis of equal protection might be
somewhat different under the ICRA than under the tribal constitution. Bigfire, 25
Indian L. Rptr. at 6230, 6233.
54. Although some scholars have suggested that tribal courts are much less likely
to follow precedent than American courts, Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 20, at 59,
my limited experience practicing before tribal courts in the Northwestern United
States suggests that precedent from the particular tribal court deciding a case, where
available, is immensely important and that tribal courts often look to opinions from
other tribes as persuasive authority. See also Taylor, supra note 43, at 240 (“Tribal
courts will generally follow their own precedents and give considerable weight to the
decisions of other Indian courts.”); accord Nevayaktewa v. Hopi Tribe,
1998.NAHT.0000003, Nos. 97CR000931 and 97CR000932 ¶¶ 31–32 (App. Ct. of the
Hopi Tribe, Mar. 20, 1998), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter
.org/opinions/opfolder/1998.NAHT.0000003.htm (considering whether defendants’
allegations meet the requirements of an equal protection test created by Burns Pauite
Court of Appeals).
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55

Tribal Code that severely limited the rights of an unmarried father.
By contrast, the Winnebago Tribal Court upheld a sex-neutral tribal
criminal prohibition on sexual intercourse with an unemancipated
minor against an as-applied challenge that was based on the equal
protection guarantee in the tribal constitution, and its decision was
56
affirmed by the Winnebago Supreme Court. The Tribal Court of the
Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians took somewhat of a middle ground, rejecting a former employee’s equal
protection claim based on the court’s conclusion that the female
plaintiff was not similarly situated to a male who had not been
57
discharged three years before. Finally, the Mashantucket Pequot
Tribal Court has suggested that sex discrimination is covered by its
statutory equal protection clause, although it does not appear that a
litigant has yet brought a successful sex discrimination claim under
58
the clause.
1. The Northern Plains Intertribal Court of Appeals’ Decision
Regarding the Application of ICRA’s Equal Protection Guarantee in
the Context of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians’ Law
In Griffith v. Wilkie, the Northern Plains Intertribal Court of Ap-

55. Griffith v. Wilkie, 18 Indian L. Rptr. 6058, 6059 (Northern Plains Intertribal
Ct. App. 1991).
56. Bigfire, 24 Indian L. Rptr. 6232 (Winnebago Tribal Ct. 1997), aff’d 25 Indian
L. Rptr. 6229 (Winnebago Sup. Ct. 1998). The Winnebago Tribal Court also decided
three other cases dealing with similar issues, two of which were ultimately consolidated on appeal with Bigfire. Winnebago Tribe of Neb. v. Frazier, 25 Indian L. Rptr. 6021
(Winnebago Tribal Ct. 1997); Winnebago Tribe of Neb. v. Levering, 25 Indian L.
Rptr. 6022 (Winnebago Tribal Ct. 1997); Winnebago Tribe of Neb. v. Whitewater, 25
Indian L. Rptr. 6022 (Winnebago Tribal Ct. 1997); see also Bigfire, 25 Indian L. Rptr. at
6229; Rosen, supra note 23, at 541.
57. Koon v. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians, Case No. 95067-048-CV (Tribal Ct. of the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians,
July 20, 2001), slip op. at 3–4.
58. Barnes v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation, 4 Mashantucket Rptr. 477,
485, 2007 WL 2728330 (Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct. 2007) (rejecting the
plaintiff’s argument, under the statutory equal protection clause, “that the Gaming
Enterprise treats African American men differently than African American women”
because the witness’ testimony did not support the claim, and concluding that
plaintiff therefore “failed to make a prima facie showing of gender discrimination”);
see also Sawyer v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation, 3 Mashantucket Rptr. 413, 2001
WL 36037904 (Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct., Nov. 27, 2001) (granting dismissal of
plaintiff’s claims for sex discrimination in employment because the claims accrued
before passage of the law containing the equal protection guarantee and the law was
not intended to be retroactive).
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peals examined a provision of the Turtle Mountain Tribal Code that
granted the “custody, services, and earnings” of an illegitimate child
59
to the mother. The court had ordered, and considered supplemen60
tal briefing, on the issue of “the constitutionality” of the provision.
Without providing the details of its analysis on the issue, the court
concluded that, “in situations where paternity is established or
acknowledged,” the provision “denie[s the father] equal protection
61
of the law” and therefore violates 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8). It thus
remanded the case to the trial court to determine the best interests of
62
the child.
Although Griffith appears to be a strong affirmation of the concept of equal protection as construed in American culture, it is
important to recognize the harshness of the law at issue, which
accorded the mother of an illegitimate child custody as a matter of
law. Given the severity of the law, the case does not necessarily shed
light on how the court would respond to a less drastic incursion on
the unmarried father’s rights, such as a presumption in favor of
maternal custody. Moreover, perhaps also due to the harshness of the
law, the court is not explicit about its methodology for evaluating
equal protection questions. Thus, these issues will most likely have to
await a more difficult case for definitive resolution.
2. The Winnebago Courts’ Construal of the Equal Protection
Guarantee in the Tribal Constitution
This subsection examines the trial court’s decision in Bigfire and
that of the Winnebago Supreme Court. The Winnebago courts’
decisions do not entirely reject traditional federal analysis and, in fact,
incorporate some federal concepts like the requirement that a
plaintiff show she was similarly situated to someone not in the
protected class who was treated more favorably and also the concept
of differing levels of scrutiny. Nonetheless, the decisions reveal
considerable discomfort with, and resistance to, the federal approach,
at least in the context of a claim based on the tribal constitution.

59.
60.
61.
62.

Griffith, 18 Indian L. Rptr. at 6059.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6059–60.
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The Trial Court’s Decision Upholding the Law

In Bigfire, the Winnebago Tribal Court upheld a facially neutral
statutory rape law against the defendant’s allegation that prosecuting
only the male under such a law violated the equal protection provi63
sion of the Tribe’s constitution. The trial court appeared dismissive
of federal law, even as persuasive authority, and skeptical both of
whether the federal three-tiered approach to equal protection analysis
based on the type of classification at issue would serve the interests of
the Winnebago Tribal Court and of whether intermediate scrutiny
64
would be an appropriate standard for sex-based classifications.
Additionally, because the parties had not provided any information
on traditional tribal approaches to rape, the court solicited its own
expert information on the matter, and set forth in the opinion the
substance of that information, which detailed violent disfigurement as
a punishment for a wife’s unfaithfulness and the punishment of death
65
for a man’s rape of a female aged thirteen or above.
63. Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska. v. Bigfire, 24 Indian L. Rptr. 6232, 6236, 6239
(Winnebago Tribal Ct. 1997), aff’d 25 Indian L. Rptr. 6229 (Winnebago Sup. Ct.
1998). Other tribal court decisions had gone the other way but were either overruled
or reversed by the tribal supreme court. See Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Frazier,
25 Indian L. Rptr. 6021 (Winnebago Tribal Ct. 1997); Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska
v. Levering, 25 Indian L. Rptr. 6022 (Winnebago Tribal Ct. 1997); Winnebago Tribe
of Nebraska v. Whitewater, 25 Indian L. Rptr. 6022 (Winnebago Tribal Ct. 1997); see
also Bigfire, 25 Indian L. Rptr. at 6229; Rosen, supra note 23, at 541.
64. Bigfire, 24 Indian L. Rptr. at 6238–39. This somewhat dismissive attitude
toward federal law does not appear to be typical of tribal courts, most of which, in the
absence of precedent from their own courts, appear to seriously consider both the
parameters of the right at issue under federal law and whether it is appropriate to
follow federal law in construing the right. See, e.g., Nevayaktewa v. Hopi Tribe,
1998.NAHT.0000003, Nos. 97CR000931 and 97CR000932 ¶¶ 28–32 (App. Ct. of the
Hopi Tribe, March 20, 1998), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/
opinions/opfolder/1998.NAHT.0000003.htm. Indeed, Matthew Fletcher has studied
ICRA cases and determined that there is a high probability that a tribal court will use
federal and state law as persuasive authority when construing the ICRA, especially in
cases involving nonmembers. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Courts, the Indian Civil
Rights Act, and Customary Law: Preliminary Data 16, 20 (MSU Legal Studies Research
Paper, No. 06-05, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1103474.
65. Bigfire, 24 Indian L. Rptr. at 6239. Such harsh traditional punishments are
also part of the historical fabric of Western culture. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 17, at
18 (explaining that “because English women were not allowed to express political
opinions, a woman who spoke out against taxation in 1664 was condemned to having
her tongue nailed to a tree near a highway, with a paper fastened to her back
detailing her offense”); see also A COLLECTION OF ALL THE ACTS OF ASSEMBLY, NOW IN
FORCE, IN THE COLONY OF VIRGINIA 339–40 (1733) (providing that “where any such
Negro, Mullatto, or Indian, shall, upon due Proof made . . . be found to have given a
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In rejecting the defendant’s challenge to the law, the trial court
did not officially reject intermediate scrutiny or rely on the traditional
66
punishments. Rather, having determined that it was premature to
make decisions on those issues, the trial court rejected the defendant’s arguments because it determined, in essence, that he was not
67
similarly situated to the female victim. The court referred to the
“ample evidence that force or coercion was present,” the fact that the
statute was facially neutral or “benign,” the fact that the defendant
had failed to provide evidence that the law was being applied in a
discriminatory fashion, and finally, possibly based on the evidence of
force or coercion, the fact that “consent was not an issue” in this
68
case. Thus, in rejecting the defendant’s challenge, the trial court
concluded that “there seems to be little gained and huge detriments
both psychologically and in law enforcement in charging victims of
69
violent sexual assault with criminal sanctions.” Most likely, the fact
that the victim was twelve at the time of the attack while the perpetrator was seventeen-and-a-half also played a part in the court’s deci70
sion.
b.

The Winnebago Supreme Court’s Decision

This opinion was later affirmed by the Winnebago Supreme
Court. In that case, the court heard two consolidated appeals, that of
Mr. Bigfire and that of C.L., a fifteen-year-old male, who was charged
with second-degree sexual assault (i.e., statutory rape) of a thirteenyear-old girl; a third appeal had been dismissed on double jeopardy
71
grounds. The Winnebago Supreme Court adopted a strict scrutiny
test for sex but determined that the compelling tribal interest
false Testimony, every such offender shall, without further Trial, be ordered by the
said Court to have one Ear nailed to the Pillory, and there to stand for the Space of
one Hour, and then the said Ear to be cut off; and thereafter, the other Ear nailed in
like Manner, and cut off, at the expiration of one other Hour; and moreover, to order
every such Offender Thirty-Nine Lashes, well laid on, on his or her bare Back, at the
common Whipping-Post”). However, it is somewhat surprising and even disturbing,
at least from a Western perspective, to see such harsh punishments explicitly set forth
as a possible source of authority for a current decision.
66. Bigfire, 24 Indian L. Rptr. at 6238–39.
67. Id. at 6239.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 6233.
71. Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Bigfire, 25 Indian L. Rptr. 6229, 6229
(Winnebago Sup. Ct. 1998).
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requirement was satisfied in the case because traditional cultural
differentiations based on sex always constitute a compelling tribal
72
interest. The court considered “whether the use of different roles
based on gender, particularly in areas of sex and procreation, is of a
similar discriminatory and patriarchal nature [as in Anglo culture]
73
when employed within the Winnebago Tribe.” The court concluded
that, “[i]n Ho-Chunk [or Winnebago] culture . . . gender differences
or disparities in treatment do not signal hierarchy, lack of respect or
invidious discrimination,” and therefore, held that “it is not accurate
to attribute archaic stereotypes of the Anglo-American culture to the
74
Winnebago Tribe’s culture.” This conclusion was supported in part
by the statement of one of the judges deciding the case, a woman who
was a member of a related tribe; she explained that she had “no . . .
feeling of inequality . . .” as a result of tribal differentiations in sex
75
roles.
The Winnebago Supreme Court’s decision has been considered
troubling to some scholars because of the court’s indication that
76
culture would always trump the guarantee of equal protection.
However, the court also emphasized the age differences between the
perpetrators and the victims in the cases and the fact that there were
only three prosecutions, a number that was too small, in the court’s
77
view, to demonstrate a pattern of sex discrimination. Furthermore,
the court appeared to place importance on the fact that it was not
78
construing the ICRA but rather the tribal constitution. Additionally,
the court recognized that the result in the case, namely the Winnebago Supreme Court’s decision to uphold this sex-neutral statutory rape
law against a selective enforcement challenge, is not at variance with
federal law, given that the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld a sex-based
statutory rape law based on its conclusion that young women and men
79
are not similarly situated with respect to pregnancy. Also, reading
72. Id. at 6231; Rosen, supra note 23, at 541–44 (citing Bigfire, 25 Indian L. Rptr.
at 6229). This was not a traditional federal-style strict scrutiny analysis because the
court did not look at whether the governmental action was narrowly tailored to the
compelling tribal interest. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life,
551 U.S. 449, 464–65 (2007).
73. Bigfire, 25 Indian L. Rptr. at 6232.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 6233.
76. Rosen, supra note 23, at 543–44.
77. Bigfire, 25 Indian L. Rptr. at 6231.
78. Id. at 6230, 6233.
79. Michael M. v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 467 (1981); Bigfire,
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the lower court opinion in Bigfire demonstrates the weakness of the
defendant’s equal protection challenge considering the circumstances
of the case and the injustice that would evidently occur if the crime of
80
forcible rape of a twelve-year-old girl were to go unpunished.
Finally, the Winnebago Supreme Court indicated that, if sex-based
prosecutions continued, it might begin to strike them down as
violative of the sex-neutral statute; thus, it saw the statute as overrid81
ing, at least to some extent, traditional tribal customs.
In both the Winnebago Supreme Court’s discussion of the fact
that it was construing the tribal constitution rather than the ICRA and
its intimation that it might hold that future prosecutions, if shown to
be sex-based, violate the sex-neutral statute, the court evidenced a
desire to protect the uniqueness of Winnebago law, especially as
embodied in the tribal constitution, from being subsumed by federal
82
law. For instance, in the discussion preceding its conclusion that the
“Ho-Chunk tradition and customary law certainly was not rendered
83
illegal by the Tribe’s own constitution,” the court explained:
Since the legal concept of equal protection . . . is an AngloAmerican legal concept, this Court must look in part to the
current American legal tradition . . . . But this analysis must
stop short of simply applying another standard to a different
cultural system with a unique legal tradition without adjustments for or taking any account of that which is unique in
84
that system.
The court also noted that the sex-neutral statutory rape statute
showed that the “Tribal Council plainly adopted a current tribal
policy of furthering gender neutrality in this area as much as possi85
ble,” and it distinguished this current tribal policy from the more
25 Indian L. Rptr. at 6233.
80. See generally Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Bigfire, 24 Indian L. Rptr. 6232,
6236, 6239 (Winnebago Tribal Ct. 1997), aff’d 25 Indian L. Rptr. 6229 (Winnebago
Sup. Ct. 1998). Although the defendant objected on appeal to the trial court’s
conclusion that force or coercion had been at play, the evidence of force to which the
lower court alluded may still have had an emotional effect on the appellate judges.
Bigfire, 25 Indian L. Rptr. at 6229. Note that the trial court did not hear the
substantive issues in the case involving the other defendant, C.L., because his pre-trial
motion to dismiss had been granted. Id. A third defendant had been acquitted after
trial, so retrial was barred by double jeopardy. Id. at 6229, 6234.
81. Bigfire, 25 Indian L. Rptr. at 6233–34.
82. Id. at 6233–34.
83. Id. at 6233.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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permanent equal protection guarantee of the tribal constitution,
which, in the court’s view, did not mandate treating both sexes the
86
same. Thus, the Winnebago Supreme Court’s decision in Bigfire
should be read in part as an attempt to preserve the uniqueness of
tribal custom and tradition against the threat of wholesale incorporation of federal ideas. At the same time, however, the court showed
that it was willing to enforce federal legal constructs such as gender
neutrality if it could be demonstrated both that they had been
adopted as law by the Tribal Council and that they were being violated
by the tribal prosecutor. Thus, it could be said that the Winnebago
Supreme Court in Bigfire simply adopted a presumption against
construing tribal constitutional provisions identically to the way
similar provisions would be interpreted in a federal court but that,
outside of the context of the tribal constitution, for example in
construing the ICRA or a law adopted by the Tribal Council, the court
may well be more open to federal analysis.
3. The Decision of the Tribal Court in Koon v. Grand Traverse
Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians
In Koon, a tribal conservation officer who had been dismissed
from employment after she was convicted of drunk driving brought
suit alleging violation of the tribal constitution’s equal protection
87
guarantee. The basis of her claim was that a male employee was not
88
dismissed for a similar incident three years before. The court,
however, accepted the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff was not
similarly situated to this male employee because, although both
plaintiff’s job and that of the male employee involved driving, it had
become much more difficult to insure those convicted of drunk
89
driving in the intervening three years. Thus the Koon court applied
the federal requirement that a plaintiff show that she is similarly
86. Id. at 6234.
87. See generally Koon v. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians,
Case No. 95-067-048-CV (Tribal Ct. of the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa &
Chippewa Indians, July 20, 2001); see also Koon v. Grand Traverse of Ottawa &
Chippewa Indians, Case No. 95-067-048-CV (Tribal Ct. of the Grand Traverse Band of
Ottawa & Chippewa Indians, Aug. 31, 1996) (stating that the court understands
plaintiff’s equal protection claim to be grounded in the tribal constitution).
88. Koon v. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians, No. 95-067048-CV, slip op. at 3–4 (Tribal Ct. of the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa
Indians, July 20, 2001).
89. Id. slip op. at 4.
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situated to a male employee who was treated more favorably before
90
she can win a sex-based equal protection case.
4.

Summary of Tribal Equal Protection Cases

The limited available tribal case law on sex-based equal protection demonstrates that tribes take different approaches to construing
equal protection guarantees in the context of a charge of sex
discrimination. Some tribes, such as Turtle Mountain and Grand
Traverse, appear to undertake an equal protection analysis that is
more similar to the federal approach to the question, while other
tribes, such as Winnebago, will be more likely to reject sex discrimination claims that implicitly challenge traditional tribal gender roles.
Given the legacy of colonialism and the fact that tribes have had to
strive to maintain their separate existence against numerous federal
91
policies that were designed to assimilate them, it is not surprising to
see at least some tribes forging definitions of equal protection that
differ from federal definitions. It is perhaps more surprising that
92
some tribes appear to accept the federal framework as is. Regardless
of whether one sees it as advantageous for tribes to adopt discrimination laws that are similar to federal laws or hopes that tribes will adopt
unique frameworks of discrimination law, it is clear that even this
small number of cases demonstrates that tribes do take diverse
approaches to the issue of sex discrimination and that the tribes
whose laws were examined here view equal protection guarantees as
protecting individuals from sex discrimination.

90. Id.; see also Matthew L.M. Fletcher & Zeke Fletcher, A Restatement of the
Common Law of the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians, 7 TRIBAL L. J.
§ 6.02 & n.117 (2006-07) (describing Koon as requiring a female employee to show
that she is similarly situated to a male who was treated more favorably).
91. See, e.g., ANDERSON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES & COMMENTARY 103–
04, 139–42 (2008) (describing federal assimilationist policies such as allotment and
termination).
92. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 51, at 273, 279 (stating that, “[o]verall, any
solution that rejects the dominant culture’s model and accommodates the particular
needs of Tribal communities would be an improvement” over wholesale incorporation of the federal conception of due process and that “[t]he central premise of this
Article is that Euro-American law and jurisprudence is uniquely unsuited to Indian
Tribes and Tribal Courts”).
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B. Tribal Constitutions Explicitly Incorporating U.S. Constitutional
Rights
In addition to the tribal statutes and constitutions providing general guarantees of equal protection, several tribal constitutions were
93
identified that explicitly incorporate federal constitutional rights.
For example, the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe’s Constitution provides
that “no member shall be denied any of the constitutional rights or
94
guarantees enjoyed by other citizens of the United States.”
In
contrast to a general equal protection guarantee under the applicable
tribal constitution or under the ICRA, which may, as discussed above,
be subject to diverse interpretations in the context of a sex-based
classification, tribal courts construing tribal constitutional provisions
that explicitly incorporate federal constitutional rights appear to be
likely to treat sex-based classifications similarly to federal courts
construing the U.S. Constitution and therefore will most likely view
such classifications as inherently suspect and subject to intermediate
95
scrutiny. It is possible that these provisions are common, and they
93. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE COLORADO RIVER INDIAN TRIBES OF
COLORADO RIVER INDIAN RESERVATION ARIZONA AND CALIFORNIA art. III, § 3,
microformed on Indian Tribal Codes: A Microfiche Collection of Indian Law Codes
(Ralph Johnson ed. 1988) (“All rights secured to the citizens of the United States of
America by the Federal or State Constitutions shall not be impaired or abridged by
this constitution and bylaws.”); CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE LUMMI TRIBE OF THE
LUMMI RESERVATION, WASHINGTON AS AMENDED art. VIII, microformed on Indian Tribal
Codes: A Microfiche Collection of Indian Law Codes (Ralph Johnson ed. 1988) (“All
members of the Lummi Indian Tribe shall be accorded equal rights pursuant to tribal
law. No member shall be denied any of the rights or guarantees enjoyed by nonIndian citizens under the Constitution of the United States . . . .”); REVISED
CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE MINNESOTA CHIPPEWA TRIBE art. III, available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/chippewa_constandbylaws.htm (“no
member shall be denied any of the constitutional rights or guarantees enjoyed by
other citizens of the United States . . . .”); Hudson v. Hoh Tribal Bus. Comm., No.
HOH-CIV-4/91-015, 2 Tribal Appellate Court Opinions of the Northwest Intertribal
Ct. Sys. 160, 161 (Hoh Tribal Ct. of App., May 28, 1992) (quoting Article IX of the
Hoh Tribal Constitution as stating that “‘[a]ll members of the Hoh Tribe shall be
accorded equal protection of the law under this constitution’” and that “‘[n]o
member shall be denied any of the rights or guarantees enjoyed by citizens under the
Constitution of the United States’”).
94. REVISED CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE MINNESOTA CHIPPEWA TRIBE art. III,
available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/chippewa_constand
bylaws.htm.
95. See, e.g., Hudson, 2 Tribal Appellate Court Opinions of the Northwest
Intertribal Ct. Sys. at 163–64 (construing right to petition for redress of grievances
provided for in the Hoh tribal constitution according to federal constitutional
principles because the tribal constitution explicitly incorporated federal constitutionTHE
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should be taken into account in any attempt to determine whether a
96
given tribe prohibits sex discrimination.
C. The Navajo Nation’s Broad-Based, Explicit Prohibition on Sex
Discrimination
The Navajo Nation was the only tribe identified that had a broadbased provision of law in place that prohibits governmental sex
97
discrimination in all facets of tribal life. The Navajo Nation Bill of
Rights provision, enacted in 1980, provides that “[e]quality of rights
under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the Navajo Nation
98
on account of sex.”
Moreover, Navajo’s broad-based statutory
provision functions similarly to a constitutional provision in that it
empowers the tribal court to strike down conflicting statutory
99
enactments.
No tribal constitution was identified that contained a similarly
100
broad prohibition on sex discrimination, although several tribes
101
constitutionally prohibit sex discrimination in voting, and it appears
al rights).
96. Because my electronic searches were for explicitly sex-based terms, the
prevalence of such provisions is probably significantly underrepresented here. See
supra Part I.E (explaining searching methodology).
97. 1 NAVAJO NATION CODE § 3 (“Equality of rights under the law shall not be
denied or abridged by the Navajo Nation on account of sex . . . .”), available at
http://www.navajocourts.org/Harmonization/NavBillRights.htm.
98. Id.; Bennett v. Navajo Bd. of Election Supervisors, No. A-CV-26-90,
1990.NANN.0000016, ¶ 63 (Navajo Sup. Ct., Dec. 12, 1990), available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/opinions/opfolder/1990.NANN.0000016.htm.
99. Bennett, No A-CV-26-90, 1990.NANN.0000016, ¶¶ 39–40.
100. Additionally, Elmer Rusco undertook a survey of the civil liberties protections provided for in 220 tribal constitutions that were in place as of September 1981,
and he identified no broad-based prohibitions on sex discrimination. Elmer R.
Rusco, Civil Liberties Guarantees Under Tribal Law: A Survey of Civil Rights Provisions in
Tribal Constitutions, 14 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 269, 270, 284, 290 (1990). However, as his
survey is now out-of-date, it is possible that some tribal constitutions explicitly prohibit
sex discrimination generally, although I was not able to locate them in my searches.
101. CONSTITUTION OF THE FORT BELKNAP INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE FORT BELKNAP
RESERVATION MONTANA art. VII, § 1, available at http://www.tribalresource
center.org/ccfolder1/fort_belknap_const.htm; CONSTITUTION OF THE MUSCOGEE
(CREEK) NATION art. IV, § 2, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/
ccfolder1/muscogee_const.htm; CONSTITUTION & BY-LAWS OF THE CONFEDERATED
TRIBES OF WARM SPRINGS RESERVATION OREGON AS AMENDED art. IV, § 5, available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/warm_springs_constandbylaws.htm;
see also CONSTITUTION & BY-LAWS OF THE SAC & FOX TRIBE OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN IOWA art.
IV, § 4 available at http://thorpe.ou.edu/IRA/ias&fcons.html (prohibiting sex-based
disqualification from holding tribal office).
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that at least two tribes have seriously considered adopting broad-based
102
constitutional proscriptions against sex discrimination.
To the extent a culture’s responsiveness to sex discrimination can
be seen as a measure of its progressiveness, Navajo appears to be more
progressive than the United States, given the United States’ failure to
ratify a proposed amendment to the constitution that would have
103
definitively outlawed sex discrimination. The Navajo law is written
to capture a broad spectrum of discriminatory conduct. The Nation’s
Bill of Rights prohibits the Navajo Nation from “den[ying] or
abridg[ing]” “[e]quality of rights under the law . . . on account of
104
sex . . . .” While it is not clear whether the concept of “equality of
rights” differs from that of “equal protection,” the Nation’s prohibition on abridging equality increases the breadth of the provision
because, as the Navajo Supreme Court has suggested, the provision
allows for challenges to practices that burden some groups more than
others (rather than requiring a stronger showing of explicit or
105
intentional discrimination).
In consonance with the provision’s
102. Initially, it appeared that the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians
had in place such a broad-based provision, based on a document downloaded from
the National Tribal Justice Resource Center. See TURTLE MOUNTAIN BAND OF
CHIPPEWA BILL OF RIGHTS (2001), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/
ccfolder1/turtle_mountain_billofrights.htm. However, the document appeared to be
a draft and was not included in the tribe’s constitution, which is also available from
the National Tribal Justice Resource Center. CONSTITUTION & BY-LAWS OF THE TURTLE
MOUNTAIN BAND OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS BELCOURT, NORTH DAKOTA, available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/tmconst.html.
To resolve the
question, I contacted the tribal government; the Records Manager reported that she
had no knowledge of the Bill of Rights and did not believe it was current law. E-mail
from Jolean Peltier, Records Manager, Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indian
Belcourt, North Dakota, to Ann Tweedy, Teaching Fellow, California Western School
of Law, (Aug. 8, 2008) (on file with author). Similarly, the Hopi Tribe initially
appeared to have such a constitutional provision in place, CONSTITUTION OF THE HOPI
TRIBE art. IX, § 1(i), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/
hopi_const.htm, but, based on my communication with the Hopi Tribe Secretary’s
Office, it appears that only a 2003 unapproved Draft Constitution contains this
provision. Interview with Hopi Tribal Secretary’s Office (Oct. 1, 2008); see also
CONSTITUTION & BY-LAWS OF THE HOPI TRIBE art. IX, § 1 (1993), available at
http://hopicourts.com/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=50&group=13.
103. See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Amending the Exceptions Clause, 92 MINN. L. REV. 971,
971 n.2 (2008); Krakoff, supra note 8, at 1138, 1138 n.160.
104. 1 NAVAJO NATION CODE § 3, available at http://www.navajocourts.org/
Harmonization/NavBillRights.htm.
105. Bennett v. Navajo Bd. of Elections Supervisors, No. A-CV-26-90,
1990.NANN.0000016, ¶ 64 (Navajo Sup. Ct., Dec. 12, 1990), available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/opinions/opfolder/1990.NANN.0000016.htm
(suggesting that a law that caused disparate impact based on sex would violate the

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol36/iss2/5

28

Tweedy: Sex Discrimination under Tribal Law
2. Tweedy.docx

420

1/22/2010 3:13 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:2

language, the Court of Appeals of the Navajo Nation has interpreted
the provision regarding sex discrimination very broadly, in a manner
that would appear to invalidate any sex-based distinction that caused
either sex disproportionate harm:
The proper analysis of the Navajo Equal Rights guarantee is
that there can be no legal result on account of a persons
[sic] sex, no presumption in giving benefits or disabilities
gaged by a person’s sex and no legal policy which has the
106
effect of favoring one sex or the other.
Although, based on this opinion and other case law, it appeared
Navajo Bill of Rights). The language regarding denial or abridgment is derived from
the proposed Equal Rights Amendment to the United States Constitution. Bennett,
No. A-CV-26-90, 1990.NANN.0000016 at ¶ 63. Similar language is contained in the
voting rights amendments to the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. XV,
§ 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. But these Amendments, by their terms, are limited to
voting issues. Outside of the voting context, the United States has been less
protective of potential victims of discrimination than the Navajo Nation appears to
be, and the United States has upheld sex-based classifications in some circumstances
and sharply limited disparate impact claims, particularly in the equal protection
context. See, e.g., Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (upholding the validity of
federal distinctions between unmarried mothers and unmarried fathers that affect a
child’s ability to benefit from the parent’s immigration status in order to gain
admittance to the United States); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (holding
that statistical evidence that black defendants were more likely to get the death
penalty for killing white victims was not problematic under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because of the lack of evidence of discriminatory intent); cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006) (providing for employment discrimination claims based on disparate impact under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
but only where the employer cannot show that the challenged practice is “job related
for the position in question and consistent with business necessity”). Furthermore,
the Supreme Court recently made clear that it views disparate impact as merely a
secondary part of Title VII, which it sees as more directly concerned with disparate
treatment, and that an employer who wishes to voluntarily eliminate disparate
impacts will face a high burden to justify its behavior when affected employees can
plausibly claim disparate treatment as a result of the employers’ efforts. See generally
Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S.Ct. 2658 (2009); cf. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co.,
Inc., 444 F.3d 1104, 1117 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (arguing
that a casino’s employee grooming requirements that mandated that women wear
full-face make-up obviously burdened women more than men, who were not subject
to a similarly burdensome grooming requirement, and that the Majority should,
therefore, have struck down the requirements under Title VII); ANNA KIRKLAND, FAT
RIGHTS 87–88 (2008) (describing the majority opinion in Jespersen). Moreover, even
in the voting rights context, the U.S. Supreme Court has sometimes seemed loathe to
look closely at potential disparate impacts. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion County
Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1622–23 (April 28, 2008); see also id. at 1626 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
106. Help v. Silvers, No. A-CV-01-82, 1983.NANN.0000001, ¶ 32 (Navajo May 6,
1983), available at http://www.tribal-institute.org/opinions/1983.NANN.0000001.htm.
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that any sex-based distinction that favored one sex over the other in
any measure would not survive a Navajo Nation Bill of Rights chal107
lenge, one Navajo Supreme Court case allowed sex, based on
traditional Navajo cultural norms that highly-valued grazing rights
generally are to descend to female relatives, to factor into the issue of
108
the descent of such rights.
From the main opinion, it does not
appear that the Bill of Rights issue was raised by the parties, but
Justice Benally argued in a concurring opinion that the court’s
holding violated the Bill of Rights’ prohibition of sex discrimina109
tion.
The majority responded to this argument in a footnote,
stating that
110
Contrary to the characterization in the dissenting [sic]
opinion, this opinion does not mean that the gender of the
claimant is dispositive . . . . In fact, the rule set out in this
111
opinion is that the Keedah factors and traditional law on
women’s role in Navajo society should be considered together to decide the most logical trustee, not that if a female
and a male both claim the permit, regardless of their connections to the land, the permit automatically must go to the
112
female.
Thus, in the above footnote, the court functionally characterizes
107. Bennett v. Navajo Bd. of Elections Supervisors, No. A-CV-26-90,
1990.NANN.0000016, ¶¶ 63–65 (Navajo Dec. 12, 1990), available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/opinions/opfolder/1990.NANN.0000016.htm
(rejecting the plaintiff’s unelaborated claim that a requirement of prior tribal
employment for holding elected office constituted impermissible sex discrimination
under the Navajo Bill of Rights and stating that “Bennett did not show how or why it
caused a discriminatory or disparate impact on those of her gender, excluding or
inhibiting them from public elective office” and that “[w]hile it may be true that in
the past women have been excluded or discouraged from the ranks of the Navajo
Nation Council . . . Bennett was denied a place on the ballot because she had not
been employed by the Navajo tribal organization. The Court is sensitive to the
possibility of a past pattern and practice of excluding women from public office, but
there are sufficient numbers of women employed by the Navajo Nation to make it
possible for many to run for public office under the statute”).
108. Riggs v. Estate of Attakai, No. SC-CV-39-04, slip op. at 3–4 & 4 n.5 (Navajo
June 13, 2007), available at http://www.navajocourts.org/NNCourtOpinions
2007/09Sista%20Riggs%20v%20Estate%20of%20Tom%20Attakai.pdf.
109. Id. slip op. at 7 (Benally, J., concurring).
110. The majority appears to be mistakenly characterizing the concurrence as a
dissent. See id.
111. Begay v. Keedah, No. A-CV-09-91, 1991.NANN.0000007 (Navajo Nov 26,
1991) available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/opinions/opfolder/
1991.NANN.0000007.htm.
112. Riggs, No. SC-CV-39-04, slip op. at 4 n.5.
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the language set forth below, which occurs slightly earlier in the
opinion, as allowing sex to be factored into the grazing permit
descent decision:
Traditionally, women are central to the home and land base.
They are the vein of the clan line. The clan line typically
maintains a land base upon which the clan lives, uses the
land for grazing and agricultural purposes and maintains
the land for medicinal and ceremonial purposes . . . . This is
why women are attached to both the land base and the grazing permits. For the most part, Navajos maintain and carry
on the custom that the maternal clan maintains traditional
113
grazing and farming areas.
The Majority’s characterization of women’s traditional role is, as
the concurring opinion acknowledges, consistent with the matrilineal
114
and matrilocal character of Navajo society.
Thus, despite the very strong language prohibiting sex discrimination in Navajo’s Bill of Rights and the absolute terms of one Navajo
Appellate opinion, it appears that the Navajo Supreme Court is willing
to allow sex to be a factor in at least the area of grazing rights
inheritance when consistent with traditional Navajo culture. Nonetheless, depending on how broadly or narrowly the Navajo Supreme
Court is willing to make such distinctions, Navajo law concerning sex
discrimination may well be considerably more stringent than U.S. law
115
in terms of the types of distinctions the Navajo courts will uphold.
In fact, it is quite possible that such distinctions may be limited to
highly traditional aspects of Navajo culture. Moreover, given the
Navajo Supreme Court’s statement that disparate impact falls within
116
the purview of the Bill of Rights provision, it appears that the Navajo
Bill of Rights provision is considerably broader than the U.S. concept
117
of equal protection in the very significant area of disparate impact.
D. Context-Specific Protections
In addition to Navajo’s explicit, broad-based provision and the
more general equal protection provisions discussed above, twenty-five
113. Id., slip op. at 3.
114. Id., slip op. at 7 (Benally, J., concurring).
115. See, e.g., supra notes 79, 105 (citing U.S. law).
116. Bennett v. Navajo Bd. of Elections Supervisors, No. A-CV-26-90,
1990.NANN.0000016, ¶ 64 (Navajo Dec. 12, 1990), available at http://www.tribal
resourcecenter.org/opinions/opfolder/1990.NANN.0000016.htm.
117. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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tribes were identified that have at least one context-specific law
118
Although most of the
explicitly prohibiting sex discrimination.
118. CONSTITUTION OF THE FORT BELKNAP INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE FORT BELKNAP
RESERVATION MONTANA art. VII, § 1 (providing for voting rights regardless of sex),
available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/fort_belknap_const.htm;
CONSTITUTION OF THE MUSCOGEE (CREEK) NATION art. IV, § 2, available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/muscogee_const.htm (providing for
voting rights regardless of sex); CONSTITUTION & BY-LAWS OF THE SAC & FOX TRIBE OF
THE MISSISSIPPI IN IOWA art. IV, § 4, available at http://thorpe.ou.edu/IRA/
ias&fcons.html (prohibiting sex-based disqualification from holding tribal office);
CONSTITUTION & BY-LAWS OF THE CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF WARM SPRINGS RESERVATION
OREGON AS AMENDED art. IV, § 5, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter
.org/ccfolder1/warm_springs_constandbylaws.htm (providing for voting rights regardless of sex); BAY MILLS INDIAN COMMUNITY LAW & CODES, ORD. TO REGULATE THE
OPERATION OF GAMING BY THE BAY MILLS INDIAN COMMUNITY § 7.27, available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/bmgaming.htm (prohibiting sex
discrimination in operation of gaming enterprise); BLACKFEET TRIBAL LAW & ORDER
CODE ch. 3, § 4(A)(1), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/
ccfolder1/blkftcp3equal.htm (prohibiting creditors from engaging in sex
discrimination); THE CHEROKEE CODE: PUBLISHED BY ORDER OF THE EASTERN BAND OF
CHEROKEE INDIANS ch. 95, art. II, § 95-13(c), available at http://www.tribal
resourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/eccodech95wages.htm (prohibiting sex discrimination
in employment); CHITIMACHA COMPREHENSIVE CODES OF JUSTICE & CHITIMACHA
COMPREHENSIVE “RULES OF THE COURT ” tit. VI, ch. 3, § 304(c), available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/chitimcodet6family.htm (providing
that there should be no sex-based presumption in child custody cases); THE
CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE GRAND RONDE COMMUNITY OF OREGON [ORDINANCES],
§ 480(P)(5)(F), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/gr480
tribhou.htm (providing that the landlord’s sex discrimination against the tenant can
be used as a defense to eviction); FORT PECK COMPREHENSIVE CODE OF JUSTICE 2000, tit.
X, ch. 3, § 304(b), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/
fortpeck_justicecode_10.htm (providing that “there shall be no presumption that a
parent is better suited to be custodial parent based on that parent’s gender”); GRAND
TRAVERSE BAND CODE: STATUTES OF THE GRAND TRAVERSE BAND OF OTTAWA & CHIPPEWA
INDIANS, tit. 18, ch. 8, § 825, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/
ccfolder1/travcode18gaming.htm (prohibiting gaming operators from discriminating
based on sex); LITTLE RIVER BAND OF OTTAWA INDIANS ORDINANCES & REGULATIONS ch.
600, § 2.2, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/little
river_ottawa_ordandreg.htm (prohibiting sex discrimination in employment except
where sex is a bona fide occupational qualification); OGLALA SIOUX LAW & ORDER
CODE ch. 17, pt. II.B., § I, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/
oglala_lawandorder17.htm (declaring it to be the policy of the tribe not to
discriminate in employment based on sex or other grounds); SAULT STE. MARIE TRIBE
OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS TRIBAL CODE ch. 83, subch.VII, § 83.702(6), available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/sault_stmarie_tribalcode.htm (providing that the landlord’s sex discrimination against the tenant can be used as a
defense to eviction); SISSETON-WAHPETON SIOUX TRIBE ch. 59, § 59-07-03, available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/sisseton_wahpeton_codeoflaw59.htm
(setting out an administrative complaint procedure for worker who believes she has
been discriminated against based on sex or other grounds); SKOKOMISH TRIBAL CODE
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provisions identified were part of tribal code, some were constitutional provisions, and a few were either created by common law or
119
contained in administrative materials. In terms of code-based laws
alone, this means that roughly twenty-two percent of tribes whose
codes were available online from the National Tribal Justice Resource
Center had some statutory protection from sex discrimination in
120
place.
All of the sex discrimination laws cited above generally
demonstrate that each of these twenty-five tribes has a policy against

tit. 4, § 4.02.150(ee), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/
skokomish_tribalcode_4.htm (prohibiting gaming operators from discriminating
based on sex and other grounds); SUSANVILLE RANCHERIA [TRIBAL ORDINANCES] tit. I, §
7.6.2, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/susvillegaming
entire.htm (prohibiting gaming operation from discriminating based on sex); WHITE
EARTH BAND OF CHIPPEWA RULES OF CRIM. P. 1.02, available at http://www
.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/whtearth_lawandorder.htm (prohibiting discrimination based on sex and other grounds in application of rules of criminal
procedure); YSLETA DEL SUR PUEBLO CODE OF LAWS, art. 4, pt. 6, § 4.6.20(F), available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/ysletaarticle4.htm (defining intentional sexual harassment as a civil infraction); Brooks v. Cherokee Nation, 5 Okla.
Trib. 178, 1996 WL 1132752 (Cherokee Nov. 6, 1996) (discussing the sexual
harassment law of the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma); White v. Day, 7 Am. Tribal L.
Rptr. 246, 2008 WL 2690792, at *2 (Ho-Chunk Trial Ct., 2008) (quoting the
Employment Relations Act of 2004, which prohibits “discriminat[ion] based on
individual’s sex”); Hoopa Forest Indus. v. Jordan, 25 Indian L. Rptr. 6159 (Hoopa
Valley Tribal Ct., 1998) (reviewing and reversing, apparently under tribal common
law while looking to federal law in an advisory capacity, an agency determination of
hostile work sexual harassment because the conduct alleged failed to rise to the
required level of severity and because of other evidentiary problems and also quoting
the tribal personnel policy’s narrower proscription against sexual harassment); Fargo
v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Ent., 2 Mashantucket Rptr. 145, 147, 153,
(Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct. Oct. 6, 1997), available at http://www.tribalresource
center.org/opinions/opfolder/1997.NAMP.0000030.htm (upholding plaintiff’s termination due to sexual harassment); LaVigne v. Mohegan Tribe of Indians, 32 Indian
L. Rptr. 6044 (Mohegan Tribal Ct. 2005) (upholding the plaintiff’s termination from
employment due to “sexual harassment”); cf. Renecker v. Tulalip Casino, No. TULEMP-11/96-667, 5 Northwest Intertribal Court App. 1, 1–2 (May 29, 1997) (reversing
appellant’s termination because of procedural errors in the administrative process
but noting that “any one of the four allegations [of racial and gender slurs] involves
‘major offenses’” as defined in the Tribe’s Human Rights Ordinance).
Notably, Navajo also has other context-specific sex-discrimination laws in
place, as discussed below. See, e.g., NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN., 21 Navajo Code §
509(B) (prohibiting telecommunications service providers from discriminating based
on sex).
119. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 118. Fifteen of the laws cited in note 118 are code provisions
downloaded from the National Tribal Justice Resource Center. See also supra Part I.E
(explaining that the codes of sixty-nine tribes were available on the site during the
period of my research).
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sex discrimination, although in the case of tribes that both legally
prohibit sex discrimination in some circumstances and make sexbased distinctions in others, the policy is necessarily a complicated
121
one. Some tribes, such as the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians,
have several anti-discrimination laws that cover sex discrimination in
different, rather broad contexts, while other tribes, such as Chitima122
cha Tribe, appear to have only one or two very narrow laws in place.
Below is a brief summary of the sex-discrimination laws by category,
beginning with broader laws and proceeding to narrower ones.
121. The Oglala Sioux and the Blackfeet are two of the tribes that have both
multiple laws prohibiting sex discrimination as well as laws that explicitly make sexbased distinctions. See, e.g., BLACKFEET TRIBAL LAW & ORDER CODE ch. 3, § 4(A)(1),
available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/blkftcp3equal.htm
(prohibiting creditors from engaging in sex discrimination); THE FAMILY COURT OF
THE BLACKFEET TRIBE OF THE BLACKFEET INDIAN RESERVATION FAMILY CODE, CODE OF
ETHICS FOR BLACKFEET FAMILY COURT MEMBERS R. 6, available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/blkft1to22familyct.htm (providing
that “[t]he Blackfeet Family Court Members will serve and respond to requests
without bias because of race, religion, sex, age, national origin or handicap”);
BLACKFEET TRIBAL LAW & ORDER CODE ch. 2, § 7, available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/blkftcode2civil.htm (allowing for
imprisonment of only male debtors in cases of fraud, potential abscondment, or
removal or concealment of property); OGLALA SIOUX LAW & ORDER CODE ch. 17, pt.
II.B., § I, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/oglala_lawand
order17.htm (declaring it to be the policy of the tribe not to discriminate in
employment based on sex or other grounds); OGLALA SIOUX LAW & ORDER CODE ch.
18, ch. 1, ¶ 8, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/
oglala_lawandorder18.htm (stating in “Declaration of Policy” that Contractors and
Sub-Contractors shall not, in exercising the Tribe’s employment preference for
Indians, discriminate among Indians on the basis of sex or on other grounds);
OGLALA SIOUX LAW & ORDER CODE ch. 9, § 104, available at http://www.tribal
resourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/oglala_lawandorder9.htm (creating the crime of
having carnal knowledge of a female under the age of sixteen).
122. Compare THE CHEROKEE CODE: PUBLISHED BY ORDER OF THE EASTERN BAND OF
CHEROKEE INDIANS, ch. 95, art. II, § 95-13(c), available at http://www.tribalresource
center.org/ccfolder1/eccodech95wages.htm (prohibiting sex discrimination in
employment), and THE CHEROKEE CODE: PUBLISHED BY ORDER OF THE EASTERN BAND OF
CHEROKEE INDIANS ch. 16, art. IV, § 16-4.09(a)(4), available at http://www.tribal
resourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/eccodech16gaming.htm (providing that “[t]here shall
be no discrimination in any gaming operations by reason of race, color, sex or
creed”), and THE CHEROKEE CODE: PUBLISHED BY ORDER OF THE EASTERN BAND OF
CHEROKEE INDIANS, ch. 14, art. I, § 14-1.5, available at http://www.tribal
resourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/eccodech14criminallaw.htm (providing for compliance with, subjection to, charging under, and jurisdiction pursuant to criminal laws to
be without regard to sex or other prohibited grounds), with CHITIMACHA
COMPREHENSIVE CODES OF JUSTICE & CHITIMACHA COMPREHENSIVE “RULES OF THE
COURT ” tit. VI, ch. 3, § 304(c), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/
ccfolder1/chitimcodet6family.htm (no sex-based presumption in custody cases).
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Employment
a. Sex Discrimination Explicitly Prohibited in Employment
Generally

Four tribes have broadly worded, explicit prohibitions on sex
123
discrimination in employment in their tribal codes, and two other
tribes appear to have such laws in place based on discussions in tribal
124
court opinions.
One of the four tribes, the Little River Band of
Ottawa Indians, carves out an exception to the prohibition where sex
125
This BFOQ
is a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).
123. THE CHEROKEE CODE: PUBLISHED BY ORDER OF THE EASTERN BAND OF CHEROKEE
INDIANS ch. 95, art. II, § 95-13(c), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/
ccfolder1/eccodech95wages.htm (prohibiting sex discrimination in employment);
LITTLE RIVER BAND OF OTTAWA INDIANS ORDINANCES & REGULATIONS ch. 600, § 2.2,
available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/littleriver_ottawa_ordand
reg.htm (prohibiting sex discrimination in employment except where sex is a bona
fide occupational qualification); OGLALA SIOUX LAW & ORDER CODE ch. 17, pt. II.B, §
I, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/oglala_lawandorder17
.htm (declaring it to be the policy of the tribe not to discriminate in employment
based on sex or other grounds); SISSETON-WAHPETON SIOUX TRIBE ch. 59, § 59-07-03,
available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/sisseton_wahpeton_code
oflaw59.htm (setting out administrative complaint procedure for a worker who
believes she has been discriminated against based on sex or other grounds).
Note that a provision in the Susanville Indian Rancheria’s Bylaws also
requires the Tribal Council to “[c]ommit to providing an environment that is free
from discrimination.” SUSANVILLE INDIAN RANCHERIA CONSTITUTION & BYLAWS art. III,
§ 4(6), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/susanvilleconst.htm.
The later mention of “sexual harassment” in this provision may imply that the
generic reference to “discrimination” is meant to include sex discrimination. Id.
However, because the reference to sex discrimination was not explicit, this provision
is only relied on in the sexual harassment discussion.
124. White v. Day, 7 Am. Tribal L. Rptr. 246, 2008 WL 2690792, at *2 (Ho-Chunk
Trial Ct. Jan. 14, 2008) (quoting the Employment Relations Act of 2004, which
prohibits “discriminat[ion] based on individual’s sex”); Renecker v. Tulalip Casino,
No. TUL-EMP-11/96-667, 5 Northwest Intertribal Court App. 1, 1-2 (May 29, 1997)
(reversing appellant’s termination because of procedural errors in the administrative
process but noting that “any one of the four allegations [of racial and gender slurs]
involves ‘major offenses’” as defined in the Tribe’s “detailed Human Rights
Ordinance”); see also Funmaker v. Doornbos, 24 Indian L. Rptr. 6095, 6095 (HoChunk Nation Tribal Court, August 22, 1996) (quoting prohibition on sex discrimination in employment in the Tribe’s Personnel Policies & Procedures Manual).
125. LITTLE RIVER BAND OF OTTAWA INDIANS ORDINANCES & REGULATIONS ch. 100,
§ 2.2, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/littleriver_ottawa_
ordandreg.htm. A bona fide occupational qualification means that “[e]mployment
in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex, religion, or
national origin unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or national origin is
an actual qualification for performing the job.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 177 (6th
ed., 1990); see also KIRKLAND, supra note 105, at 90–93 (explaining the concept of a
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exception also applies to age and disability; however, it does not apply
to race, marital status, national origin, or other specified suspect
126
classes. This differentiation may indicate that sex is considered to
be less inherently suspect in that Tribe than the categories, such as
127
Federal law similarly
race, that are not subject to the exception.
provides that a bona fide occupational qualification may be a defense
128
to allegations of sex discrimination but not race discrimination. It
may be the case that the three tribes whose codes do not provide for a
BFOQ defense would not allow for one under common law if the
issue was raised in a case or administrative proceeding. Thus, these
three tribes may take a harder line on sex discrimination than would a
129
federal court.
However, it is difficult to make predictions about
such issues.
b.

Specialized Categories of Employment
i.

Employment by Contractors and Subcontractors

One of the six tribes that has in place a general prohibition on
sex discrimination in employment, the Oglala Sioux, also has a law
providing that “[c]ontractors or subcontractors extending such
preference [to Indians] shall not, however, discriminate among
Indians on the basis of religion, sex, or tribal affiliation, and the use of
such a preference [for Indian employees] shall not excuse a contractor or subcontractor from complying with the other requirements
130
contained in this chapter.”
BFOQ exception and its meaning under federal law, particularly its indication that
sex differentiations need not be eliminated in all cases, in contrast to race differentiations).
126. LITTLE RIVER BAND OF OTTAWA INDIANS ORDINANCES & REGULATIONS, ch. 100,
§ 2.2, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/littleriver_ottawa_
ordandreg.htm.
127. See, e.g., KIRKLAND, supra note 105, at 90–93 (explaining that, under federal
law, the BFOQ exception indicates that laws creating sex differentiations need not be
eliminated in all cases, in contrast to laws creating race differentiations and that this
difference indicates more societal tolerance for sex-based distinctions than for racebased distinctions).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2006); see also KIRKLAND, supra note 105, at 90–93
(explaining the concept of a BFOQ and its meaning under federal law, particularly its
indication that laws providing for sex differentiations need not be eliminated in all
cases, in contrast to laws providing for race differentiations).
129. See Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 20, at 35 (explaining that tribal “codes
usually aspire to cover all eventualities”).
130. OGLALA SIOUX LAW & ORDER CODE, ch. 18, ch. 1, ¶ 8, available at http://www
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ii. Gaming
A total of six tribes, including two of the six that have prohibitions on sex discrimination in employment and one, the Navajo, that
has a broad-based general prohibition on sex discrimination generally, prohibit sex discrimination in the operation of their gaming
131
enterprises. Given that these tribes’ gaming enterprises may well be
the largest employer among the tribal government and its enterprises
or even in the geographical area for some of the more rural tribes,
these laws are a significant source of protection.
c.

Sexual Harassment

Evaluating tribal protections against sexual harassment is complicated somewhat by the fact that some tribes, contrary to the traditional federal view, consider sexual harassment to be an act perpetrated
by one individual against another, rather than an employment rights
132
issue.
Such tribes may treat harassment, implicitly or explicitly
including sexual harassment, as a civil infraction, a misdemeanor, or
133
even a tort.
Other tribes consider sexual harassment to be an
.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/oglala_lawandorder18.htm.
131. BAY MILLS INDIAN COMMUNITY LAW & CODES, ORDINANCE TO REGULATE THE
OPERATION OF GAMING BY THE BAY MILLS INDIAN COMMUNITY, § 7.27, available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/bmgaming.htm (prohibiting sex
discrimination in operation of gaming enterprise); THE CHEROKEE CODE: PUBLISHED
BY ORDER OF THE EASTERN BAND OF CHEROKEE INDIANS, ch. 16, art. IV, § 16-4.09(a)(4),
available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/eccodech16gaming.htm
(“There shall be no discrimination in any gaming operations by reason of race, color,
sex or creed . . . .”); GRAND TRAVERSE BAND CODE: STATUTES OF THE GRAND TRAVERSE
BAND OF OTTAWA & CHIPPEWA INDIANS, tit. 18, ch. 8, § 825, available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/travcode18gaming.htm (prohibiting
gaming operators from discriminating based on sex); NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 5, §
2039(B)(3) (2008) (“[t]he Navajo Nation, the gaming enterprise and a Management
Contractor shall not discriminate in the employment of persons to work for the
gaming enterprise or the Gaming Facility on the grounds of . . . gender . . . .”);
SKOKOMISH TRIBAL CODE, tit. 4, § 4.02.150(ee), available at http://www.tribalresource
center.org/ccfolder1/skokomish_tribalcode_4.htm (prohibiting gaming operators
from discriminating based on sex and other grounds); SUSANVILLE INDIAN RANCHERIA
[ORDINANCES], tit. I, § 7.6.2, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/
ccfolder1/susvillegamingentire.htm (prohibiting gaming operation from discriminating based on sex or other grounds).
132. See, e.g., YSLETA DEL SUR PUEBLO CODE OF LAWS, art. 4, pt. 6, § 4.6.20(F)
(defining intentional sexual harassment as a civil infraction), available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/ysletaarticle4.htm.
133. See, e.g., POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS CODE, ch. 8, § 8-2-2 (defining the
crime of harassment, without explicit mention of sexual harassment, as a misdemean-
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employment issue but define it as a potential basis for discipline of the
harassing employee rather than explicitly defining it as the basis for a
134
cause of action by the injured employee.
Because this subpart is specifically limited to laws that explicitly
apply to sex discrimination, this section on sexual harassment does
not include the laws that simply provide protection against harassment without discussion of sexual harassment. However, the Ysleta
Pueblo del Sur law that defines “sexual harassment” as a prohibited

or that involves “strik[ing], shov[ing], kick[ing], or otherwise touch[ing] a person or
subject[ing] him to physical contact; or . . . direct[ing] abusive or obscene language
or mak[ing] an obscene gesture toward another person”); YSLETA DEL SUR PUEBLO
CODE OF LAWS, art. 4, pt. 6, § 4.6.20(F), available at http://www.tribalresource
center.org/ccfolder1/ysletaarticle4.htm (defining intentional sexual harassment
explicitly as a type of harassment that is punishable as a civil infraction); Hoopa
Forest Industries v. Jordan, 25 Indian L. Rptr. 6159, 6160 (Hoopa Valley Tribal Ct.
1998) (quoting the tribe’s personnel policy as providing that “[e]mployees shall be
provided a safe work environment, free from harassment of any sort, i.e., verbal,
physical, visual. The Tribal Council accepts no liability for harassment of one
employee by another. The individual who makes unwelcome advances, threatens or
in any way harasses another employee is personally liable for such actions and their
consequences.”).
The tribal view of sexual harassment as a crime is similar to that of the
French law, under which sexual harassment is treated as a criminal matter specific to
the perpetrator (rather than creating any employer liability). Abigail C. Saguy, What
is Sexual Harassment? From Capitol Hill to Sorbonne, 27 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 45, 47–48
(2004). Although there is also a sexual harassment provision in the French Labor
Code, this merely protects an employee from retaliation, rather than imposing direct
employer liability. Id. at 48.
134. See, e.g., Brooks v. Cherokee Nation, 5 Okla. Trib. 178, 1996 WL 1132752
(Nov. 6, 1996); Fargo v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enterprise, 2 Mashantucket
Rptr. 145, 147, 153, 1997 WL 34639655 (Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct. Oct. 6,
1997); LaVigne v. Mohegan Tribe of Indians, 32 Indian L. Rptr. 6044 (Mohegan
Tribal Ct. 2005); see also Yazzie v. Sanitation, 7 Am. Tribal L. Rptr. 543, 2007 WL
5884947, *3–4 (Navajo July 11, 2007) ((1) reciting the fact that Navajo Nation has a
sexual harassment policy for tribal employees, (2) dismissing plaintiff’s claim against
her employer for sexual harassment, which had originally been brought before the
Navajo Nation Labor Commission, because it was not cognizable under the Navajo
Nation Preference in Employment Act and because such a claim should not be read
into the Act as sexual harassment was still in a “nascent stage” of development in the
Navajo environment, and (3) suggesting the possibility that the claim could be heard
in the Navajo district court); cf. Schock v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enterprise, 3
Mashantucket Rptr. 129, 1999 WL 34828705 (Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct. Sept.
20, 1999) (holding plaintiff’s sexual harassment claim against the tribal gaming
enterprise to be barred by sovereign immunity because, although the perpetrator
acted during work hours, he did not, according to the court, act within the scope of
his employment, but allowing plaintiff’s negligent supervision claims that were based
on the same harassing behavior to go to trial because the tribe had enacted a waiver
of sovereign immunity for negligence-based actions).
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type of harassment is included although the application of that law is
personal to the perpetrator and applies more broadly than solely in
135
the employment context. Although some ambiguities remain, in
all, nine tribes appear to have policies or laws in place that prohibit
136
sexual harassment in the workplace and one tribe has directed its
135. See, e.g., YSLETA DEL SUR PUEBLO CODE OF LAWS, art. 4, pt. 6, § 4.6.20(F),
available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/ysletaarticle4.htm
(defining intentional sexual harassment as a civil infraction). Similarly, the Hoopa
Valley Tribe is included based on case law that suggests that that Tribe may allow both
claims against the employer and claims against the individual perpetrator in the
employment context. Jordan, 25 Indian L. Rptr. at 6160 & n.1.
136. OGLALA SIOUX LAW & ORDER CODE, ch.17, pt. III (under section heading
entitled “Interviewing, Screening, and Testing,” requiring comprehensive
background check on all applicants for employment, including determination of
whether the applicant has been subject to “dismissal[s] from previous jobs due to
sexual harassment”); SUSANVILLE INDIAN RANCHERIA CONSTITUTION & BYLAWS, BYLAWS,
art. III, § 4(6), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/
susanvilleconst.htm (requiring the Tribal Council to “[c]ommit to providing an
environment that is free of discrimination, harassment, violence, and intimidation
and that is drug free, as required by law. The Tribal Business Council shall not
tolerate any form of threatening or abusive behavior, nor tolerated [sic] sexual
harassment or other forms of harassment or discrimination . . . .”); YSLETA DEL SUR
PUEBLO CODE OF LAWS, art. 4, pt. 6, § 4.6.20(F), available at http://www.tribal
resourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/ysletaarticle4.htm (defining intentional sexual
harassment as a civil infraction); Brooks v. Cherokee Nation, 5 Okla. Trib. 178, 1996
WL 1132752 (Nov. 6, 1996) (upholding dismissal of tribal employee for sexual
harassment); Lonetree v. Garvin, 34 Indian L. Rptr. 6126 (Ho-Chunk Nation Sup. Ct.
Oct. 8, 2007) (Plaintiff, who had been dismissed from tribal employment for sexual
harassment, challenged the administrative proceedings based on due process, and,
“[b]ecause the [plaintiff did] . . . not deny that he committed sexual harassment,”
the Ho-Chunk Nation Supreme Court “affirm[ed] the trial court’s decision to
remand to the GRB [Grievance Review Board] to resolve the sole issue of whether the
[defendant] . . . would have terminated the [plaintiff’s] . . . employment even if the
pre-deprivation hearing had occurred”); Jordan, 25 Indian L. Rptr. at 6160 & n.1
(reversing a tribal agency’s determination that the employer was liable for sexual
harassment based upon the facts that the agency had not entered findings of fact and
conclusions of law, that the agency had relied on an exhibit that was not in the
record, and that the conduct at issue did not rise to the level of severity required
under federal standards, which the court appeared to be using in an advisory
capacity, despite the statement in tribal personnel policies that only an individual
harasser could be held liable for sexual harassment); Fargo v. Mashantucket Pequot
Gaming Enterprise, 2 Mashantucket Rptr. 145, 147, 153, 1997 WL 34639655
(Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct. Oct. 6, 1997) (upholding tribal employee’s
termination for sexual harassment and citing Employee Handbook’s provision on
sexual harassment); LaVigne, 32 Indian L. Rptr. at 6045 (finding as fact that
“Mohegan Tribe Policy #51 strictly forbids sexual harassment in the workplace”);
Yazzie, 7 Am. Tribal L. 543, 2007 WL 5884947, at *3 (reciting the fact that Navajo
Nation has a sexual harassment policy for tribal employees); see also Toledo v. Bashas’
Diné Market, 6 Am. Tribal L. 796, 2006 WL 6168967 (Navajo Nation Sup. Ct. Aug. 17,
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137

general manager to create such a policy, so it may now in fact have a
policy in place. Two of these tribes also prohibit employment
discrimination based on sex generally, and two of them prohibit it in
138
the gaming context. Finally, Navajo, one of the two that has both a
prohibition on sexual harassment and a prohibition on sex discrimination in its gaming operation, also has a broad-based tribal prohibition on sex discrimination, as discussed above. Thus, it appears that
some tribes recognize sexual harassment that do not explicitly
139
recognize other forms of sex discrimination.
d.

Maternity and Paternity Leave and Related Laws

While not a sex discrimination law per se, at least one tribe, the

2006) (affirming private on-reservation employer’s dismissal of employee based on
sexual harassment under the employer’s personnel policy, despite the ambiguity of
the policy).
Note that the language of the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo law appears to be
particularly relevant to the employment context: “‘Sexual Harassment’ means
unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature, submission to which is made a term or condition of a
person’s exercise or enjoyment of any right, privilege, power, or immunity, either
explicitly or implicitly.” YSLETA DEL SUR PUEBLO CODE OF LAWS, art. 4, pt. 6, § 4.6.22
(emphasis omitted), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/
ysletaarticle4.htm.
137. THE CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE GRAND RONDE COMMUNITY OREGON
[ORDINANCES], § 370(d)(3), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/
ccfolder1/gr370personnel.htm (“The General Manager shall develop and implement
policies and procedures to prevent the sexual harassment of employees, applicants,
clients and Tribal members.”).
138. NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 5, § 2039(B)(3) (prohibiting sex discrimination by
gaming operation); OGLALA SIOUX LAW & ORDER CODE, ch. 17, pt. II.B., § I, available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/oglala_lawandorder17.htm
(declaring it to be the policy of the Tribe not to discriminate in employment based
on sex or other grounds); SUSANVILLE INDIAN RANCHERIA [ORDINANCES], tit. I, § 7.6.2,
available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/susvillegamingentire.htm
(prohibiting gaming operation from discriminating based on sex or other grounds);
Funmaker v. Doornbos, 24 Indian L. Rptr. 6095, 6095 (Ho-Chunk Nation Tribal Ct.
August 22, 1996) (quoting prohibition on sex discrimination in employment in the
Tribe’s Personnel Policies & Procedures Manual).
139. The Ysleta Pueblo del Sur law is the most probable example of this. See
YSLETA DEL SUR PUEBLO CODE OF LAWS, art. 4, pt. 6, § 4.6.20(F), available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/ysletaarticle4.htm. The two other
tribes’ recognition of sexual harassment claims is evident from case law, and thus it is
entirely possible either that their courts would hold that sex discrimination is also
prohibited as a matter of common law or that the tribes have formal laws or policies
prohibiting such conduct. Jordan, 25 Indian L. Rptr. at 6160 & n.1; LaVigne, 32 Indian
L. Rptr. at 6045.
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Little River Band of Ottawa Indians, has enacted a law allowing its
140
Such laws are
employees to take maternity or paternity leave.
relevant to sex discrimination because of the disproportionate
141
impacts that women suffer in employment because of pregnancy.
Similarly, the Ho-Chunk Nation currently has a law in place that
142
prohibits pregnancy-based discrimination and the Navajo Nation
progressively requires all on-reservation employers to provide
breastfeeding accommodations for their employees who are working
143
mothers.
One interesting aspect of the Little River Band of Ottawa Indians’
law is that its express purpose is to protect the children that would be
affected by a failure to grant maternity (or paternity) leave to full-time
employees: “The Little River Band recognizes that its children are its
most precious asset and that the promotion of strong families is
critical. With this recognition, the Tribe has adopted the following
144
policies regarding maternity leave.”
Thus, although it clearly
140. LITTLE RIVER BAND OF OTTAWA INDIANS ORDINANCES AND REGULATIONS, ch. VI,
§ 6.10, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/littleriver_ottawa_
ordandreg.htm.
141. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006) (codifying federal Pregnancy
Discrimination Act); see generally Daniela M. de la Piedra, Flirting with the PDA: Congress
Must Give Birth to Accommodation Rights that Protect Working Women, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER
& L. 275 (2008).
142. White v. Day, 7 Am. Tribal L. Rptr. 246, 246, 2008 WL 269072, at *2 (HoChunk Trial Ct. 2008).
143. NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 15, § 704 (2008). By contrast, in the United States
outside of Indian reservations, breastfeeding accommodations appear to be largely a
matter of employer choice. See generally Sara J. Welch, Nursing Mothers Aloft, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 10, 2009, at B6 (discussing two U.S. employers who voluntarily provide
breastfeeding accommodations to working mothers who must travel while breastfeeding and the difficulty of traveling while breastfeeding generally); Jodi Kantor, On the
Job, Working Mothers Are Finding a 2-Class System, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2006, at A1 (noting
that working class women have much more difficulty continuing with breastfeeding
while working than do professional women, that there is no federal law providing for
breastfeeding accommodations on the job, and that most state laws on the issue are
“merely symbolic”). However, as of 2007, fourteen states had laws that protected or
encouraged breastfeeding on the job, at least to some degree. Lisa Hansen, A
Comprehensive Framework for Accommodating Nursing Mothers in the Workplace, 59 RUTGERS
L. REV. 885, 908–11 (2007).
Because my electronic searches of tribal codes and constitutions did not
target the words “pregnancy,” “breastfeeding,” “maternity,” or “paternity,” there
may be many other similar tribal laws in existence that I did not discover.
144. LITTLE RIVER BAND OF OTTAWA INDIANS ORDINANCES AND REGULATIONS, ch.
600, ch. VI, § 6.10 (2001), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/
ccfolder1/littleriver_ottawa_ordandreg.htm; see also NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 15,
§ 702 (2008) (“The purpose of this Act is to provide for opportunities for working
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protects women’s ability to maintain employment while pregnant
(and therefore protects women from discrimination), the primary
purpose of this particular tribal law was not to protect against
employment discrimination.
e. Summary of Employment-Related Tribal Sex Discrimination
Laws
A significant percentage of tribes appear to have some statutory
protection against sex discrimination in place that applies to employ145
ment. The most common types of anti-discrimination laws appear
to apply to employment generally, gaming, and sexual harassment.
There are likely to be many additional protections in tribal personnel
policies, but, because such policies are not widely available, they were
not addressed here except to the extent that discussion of such
policies was included in tribal case law.
2.

Voting and Other Political Rights
a.

Voting Rights

The constitutions of three tribes, namely the Fort Belknap Indian
Community, the Muscogee (Creek) Nation, and the Confederated
Tribes of the Warm Spring Reservation, outlaw sex discrimination in
146
voting. These provisions are roughly analogous to the Nineteenth

mothers to obtain the health benefits of breast-feeding . . . .”).
145. As explained above, roughly twenty-two percent of tribes whose codes were
available online from the National Tribal Justice Resource Center had some statutory
protection from sex discrimination in place. This figure is based on the fact that
fifteen of the laws cited in supra note 118 are code provisions downloaded from the
National Tribal Justice Resource Center. Part I.E. explains that the codes of sixty-nine
tribes were available on the site during the period of my research. Eight, or about
twelve percent, of tribal codes available on the National Tribal Justice Resource
Center site contained some proscription against discrimination that applied to
employment.
146. CONSTITUTION OF THE FORT BELKNAP INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE FORT BELKNAP
RESERVATION MONTANA art. VII, § 1 (providing for voting rights regardless of sex),
available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/fort_belknap_const.htm;
CONSTITUTION OF THE MUSCOGEE (CREEK) NATION art. IV, § 2, available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/muscogee_const.htm (providing for
voting rights regardless of sex); CONSTITUTION & BY-LAWS OF THE CONFEDERATED
TRIBES OF WARM SPRINGS RESERVATION OREGON AS AMENDED art. IV, § 5, available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/warm_springs_constandbylaws.htm
(providing for voting rights regardless of sex).
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147

Amendment to the United States Constitution.
b.

Rights to Hold Elected Office

The constitution of the Sac and Fox Tribe of the Mississippi in
Iowa proscribes sex-based disqualification from holding public
148
office.
3.

Application of the Laws and Rules of Procedure

Three tribes have code provisions that either prohibit or set a
policy against sex discrimination in the application of laws or the rules
149
of procedure.
For instance, the Rules of Criminal Procedure for
the White Earth Band of Chippewa set out an intent not to discriminate in purpose or effect: “These rules are intended to provide for the
just and speedy determination of criminal proceedings without the
purpose or effect of discrimination based upon race, color, creed,
religion, national origin, sex, marital status, status with regard to
public assistance, disability, handicap in communication, sexual
150
orientation, or age.” The Rules’ protection against discrimination
in both “purpose” and “effect” appears to evince a legislative intent
that the operation of the rules be free from discriminatory intent as
well as free from disparate impact on suspect classes such as sex.
Although, given the use of the word “intent,” the section may be
merely precatory rather than creating an enforceable obligation, it is
interesting that it encompasses such a broad conception of fairness,

147. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
sex.”).
148. CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS OF THE SAC AND FOX TRIBE OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN
IOWA art. IV, § 4 (prohibiting sex-based disqualification from holding tribal office),
available at http://thorpe.ou.edu/IRA/ias&fcons.html.
149. THE FAMILY COURT OF THE BLACKFEET TRIBE OF THE BLACKFEET INDIAN
RESERVATION FAMILY CODE, CODE OF ETHICS FOR BLACKFEET FAMILY COURT MEMBERS R. 6
(1999), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/lkft1to22familyct
.htm; THE CHEROKEE CODE: PUBLISHED BY ORDER OF THE TRIBAL COUNCIL OF THE EASTERN BAND OF CHEROKEE INDIANS ch. 14, art. I, § 14-1.5 (2005), available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/eccodech14criminallaw.htm#1;
WHITE EARTH BAND OF CHIPPEWA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE R. 1.02 (2000),
available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/whtearth_lawandorder
.htm#criminal.
150. WHITE EARTH BAND OF CHIPPEWA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE R. 1.02,
available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/whtearth_lawandorder
.htm#criminal.
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which can be contrasted with the “fear of too much justice” that often
151
characterizes the American judicial system.
Because the Blackfeet provision is part of the Family Court’s
“Code of Ethics,” it, like the White Earth Chippewa provision, may
not be directly enforceable, although, alternatively, its strong
language could be interpreted to dictate enforceability: “The
Blackfeet Family Court Members will serve and respond to requests
without bias because of race, religion, sex, age, national origin or
152
handicap.”
Finally, the Eastern Band of Cherokee provision uses even
stronger wording and therefore probably creates enforceable
153
obligations. Additionally, the Cherokee provision may be the most
remarkable in that it appears to put a complementary onus on the
individual not to seek exemptions or more favorable treatment based
on membership in a particular class:
(a) All persons, regardless of race, age, or sex will comply
and be subject to the laws of the Eastern Band of Cherokee
Indians whenever they are within the boundaries of Qualla
Boundary and its territories.
(b) All persons, regardless of race, age, or sex will be subject
to all of the same charges, convictions, and fines that
enrolled members of the Eastern Band are subject to.
....
(e) Tribal jurisdiction on all persons shall be equal and
nondiscriminatory towards anyone, regardless of race, age,
or sex as long as they are visiting or living or doing business
154
on the lands of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians.

151.
152.

McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 339 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
THE FAMILY COURT OF THE BLACKFEET TRIBE OF THE BLACKFEET INDIAN
RESERVATION FAMILY CODE, CODE OF ETHICS FOR BLACKFEET FAMILY COURT MEMBERS R. 6
(1999), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/blkft1to22
familyct.htm.
153. THE CHEROKEE CODE: PUBLISHED BY ORDER OF THE TRIBAL COUNCIL OF THE
EASTERN BAND OF CHEROKEE INDIANS ch. 14, art. I, § 14-1.5 (2005), available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/eccodech14criminallaw.htm#1.
154. Id. The Washington State Constitution’s Equal Rights Amendment appears
to be somewhat similar in terms of defining rights to go hand in hand with
responsibility. Machioro v. Chaney, 582 P.2d 487, 491 (Wash. 1978) (quoting the
state Equal Rights Amendment as stating that “[e]quality of rights and responsibility
under the law shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex”).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol36/iss2/5

44

Tweedy: Sex Discrimination under Tribal Law
2. Tweedy.docx

436

1/22/2010 3:13 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:2

4. Prohibition on the Use of Sex-Based Presumptions in Child
Custody Matters
Somewhat similar to the laws described above prohibiting discrimination in the application of rules and laws, three tribes have
code provisions that prohibit the use of sex-based presumptions for
155
A fourth tribe has, in
one parent or another in custody matters.
case law, rejected as “sexist” the American rule that the domicile of a
156
child follows that of his or her mother.
5.

Miscellaneous Prohibitions on Sex Discrimination

Finally, a few tribes have prohibitions on sex discrimination that
apply in other diverse contexts, such as applications for financial
credit, housing, provision of health services, treatment of prisoners,
and education.
a.

Credit Applications

The Blackfeet Tribe disallows creditors from discriminating based
on sex or other listed grounds “in any aspect of a credit transac157
This provision contains much of the same language as the
tion.”
158
Federal Equal Credit Opportunity Act and was most likely modeled
on that Act.

155. See CHITIMACHA COMPREHENSIVE CODES OF JUSTICE & CHITIMACHA INDIAN
TRIBAL COURT “RULES OF COURT ” tit. VI, ch. 3, § 304(c) (2003), available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/chitimcodet6family.htm; FT. PECK
COMPREHENSIVE CODE OF JUSTICE tit. X, ch. 3, § 304(b) (2000), available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/fortpeck_justicecode_10.htm; GRAND
TRAVERSE BAND CODE: STATUTES OF THE GRAND TRAVERSE BAND OF OTTAWA & CHIPPEWA
INDIANS, tit. 10, ch.5, § 514(b) (2003), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter
.org/ccfolder1/travcode10childfameld.htm#5; see also In re Custody of C.A.G., 5 Am.
Tribal L. 148, 2004 WL 5599397, at *2 (Fort Peck Ct. App. 2004) (applying the tribal
code’s prohibition on gender-based presumptions).
156. Father v. Mother, 3 Mashantucket Rptr. 204, slip op. ¶ 28 (Mashantucket
Pequot Tribal Ct. Mar. 9, 1999), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/
opinions/opfolder/1999.NAMP.0000010.htm (following a Cheyenne River Sioux
Tribal Court opinion and rejecting in a child custody case “‘the historically gendered
and sexist rules of Western common law’” regarding a child’s domicile) (citations
omitted); see also Fletcher, supra note 78, at 18–20 (discussing Father v. Mother).
157. BLACKFEET TRIBAL LAW & ORDER CODE ch. 3, § 4(A)(1)(1999), available at
http://www.ntjrc.org/ccfolder/blkftcp3equal.htm.
158. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (2006).
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Health Services

The Bylaws of Susanville Indian Rancheria’s health clinic require
the Board of Directors “[t]o ensure operation of the clinic without
limitation by reason of race, creed, sex or national origin except as
159
provided by Congress and federal rules and regulations.”
c.

Education

The Oglala Sioux Education Code requires the local school
board “to develop and implement a student activity program” and
requires that the development and implementation be conducted in
160
an “equitable manner with respect to . . . gender.”
While the
United States has a statute generally prohibiting discrimination in
161
education based on sex or other enumerated grounds, the Oglala
Sioux provision applies in a much narrower context.
d.

Treatment of Prisoners

Probably the most unique provision at least among these miscellaneous provisions is the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe’s antidiscrimination provision for prisoners: (1) There shall be no discrimination on grounds of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status. (2) On the other hand, it is necessary to respect the religious
beliefs and moral precepts of the group to which a prisoner be162
longs.
While it is difficult to know how this law operates in practice, the
law itself is clearly at odds with the federal trend of limiting prisoners’
163
rights and ability to seek relief. Moreover, there appears to be no
159. SUSANVILLE INDIAN RANCHERIA [ORDINANCES], BYLAWS LASSEN INDIAN HEALTH
CTR. art. II, § 2(15) (2003), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/
ccfolder1/susvillehealth.htm.
160. OGLALA SIOUX LAW & ORDER CODE, ch. 26, § VI, 600.10 STANDARD (1996),
available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/oglala_lawandorder26.htm.
161. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006) (providing, with limited exceptions, that “[n]o
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance”). For an additional
historical discussion, see Kiselewich, supra note 13, at 219 n.13.
162. SISSETON-WAHPETON SIOUX TRIBE, ch. 31, § 31-01-01 (1998), available at
http://www.ntjrc.org/ccfolder/sisseton_wahpeton_codeoflaw31.htm.
163. See, e.g., Risa E. Kaufman, Access to the Courts as a Privilege or Immunity of
National Citizenship, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1477, 1509–10, 1509 n.159 (2008) (describing
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federal statutory counterpart to the law; rather, state and federal
prisoners typically seek relief for sex discrimination by alleging a
constitutional violation of their right to equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth
164
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
Additionally, while federal
courts do, at least formally, apply intermediate scrutiny in such cases,
165
deference to the prison administration plays a large role.
By
contrast, this law, on its face, unqualifiedly prohibits sex discrimination.
Thus, like the White Earth Chippewa provision requiring equal
treatment under the tribe’s rules of criminal procedure and like the
broad-based Navajo proscription on sex discrimination, this SissetonWahpeton Sioux provision evidences a strong concern for substantive
fairness. Moreover, the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux provision extends
the concern to one class of persons whose right to fairness under
federal law has been considerably diminished.
e. Allowing Tenants to Defend Against Eviction Based on a
Landlord’s Sex-Based Discrimination
Two tribes have adopted laws that allow a tenant to defend
against an eviction on the basis that the eviction is occurring because
166
of the tenant’s sex or for other specified discriminatory reasons.
These laws are similar to a federal Fair Housing Act regulation that
prohibits landlords from evicting tenants based on sex or other
167
prohibited grounds.
Thus, as with the Oglala Sioux education
provision, these two provisions are in accord with a corresponding

the Prison Litigation Reform Act and other recent developments in federal law).
164. See, e.g., Jackson v. Thornburgh, 907 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding
federal law that grants early release to some prisoners, but not long-term female
offenders in a federal facility, does not violate equal protection); Ashann-Ra v.
Commonwealth of Virginia, 112 F. Supp. 2d 559 (W.D. Va. 2000) (holding prison
grooming policies that differ with respect to gender not to violate equal protection).
165. See Ashann-Ra, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 570–71.
166. THE CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE GRAND RONDE COMMUNITY OF OREGON
[ORDINANCES], § 480(P)(5)(F) (2003), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter
.org/ccfolder1/gr480tribhou.htm (stating that the landlord’s sex discrimination
against the tenant can be used as a defense to eviction); SAULT STE. MARIE TRIBE OF
CHIPPEWA INDIANS TRIBAL CODE, ch. 83, sub.-ch. VII, § 83.702(6) (2001), available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/sault_stmarie_tribalcode.htm (providing that a landlord’s sex discrimination against the tenant can be used as a defense
to eviction).
167. 24 C.F.R. § 100.60(b)(5) (2009).
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federal policy against housing discrimination, but they apply more
168
narrowly.
f. Prohibition on Sex Discrimination by Telecommunications
Service Providers
The Navajo Nation has a law in place that provides that “[n]o
telecommunications service provider shall, as to rates or service, make
or grant any unreasonable preference or advantage to any person, or
subject any person to unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage based
169
It is not clear how the qualifier “unreasonable”
upon . . . sex.”
would be interpreted here, but it appears to allow the companies to
make some types of sex-based distinctions. At least one state, Texas,
has a similar administrative rule prohibiting telecommunications
170
service providers from discriminating based on sex.
g.

Workers’ Compensation for Sex Organ Losses

Mashantucket Pequot’s inclusion, as of 2000, of loss of female
genitalia on its table of compensable injuries is another apparent
move toward gender equity, given that the loss of male genitalia had
171
already been included in the table. The amendment was apparently
based upon a similar amendment enacted by the State of Connecti172
cut.
6.

Summary of Context-Specific Sex Discrimination Laws

Tribes have adopted a broad range of policies and laws that protect against sex discrimination in myriad contexts. While many of
them apply in narrow circumstances, such as eviction, others are quite
broad, applying for example to all sex-based employment discrimination. Often these laws appear to reflect a deeper level of concern for
168. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2006).
169. NAVAJO NATION CODE, tit. 21, § 509(B) (2008).
170. Public Utilities Commission of Texas, Substantive Rules, ch. 26, § 26.21
(1999), available at http://www.puc.state.tx.us/rules/subrules/telecom/26toc-I/
26toc-I.pdf (prohibiting the certified telecommunications utilities from discriminating based on race, nationality, color, religion, sex, marital status, income level,
source of income, and from unreasonable discrimination on the basis of geographic
location).
171. See MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT TRIBAL LAWS ANN., tit. 13, ch. 4, § 12(b) (2008),
available at http://www.narf.org/nill/Codes/mpcode/13workerscomp.pdf; see also tit.
13, ch. 4, § 12(b) cmt. B(6).
172. Id. tit. 13, ch. 4, § 12(b) cmt. B(6).
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substantive fairness than do federal laws, and the laws sometimes
apply in contexts, such as prisoner rights, that are unusual by U.S.
standards. In a few cases, the laws appear to be modeled after similar
federal laws. The diversity of these laws suggests that tribes are indeed
“‘laboratories for democracy,’” as Raymond Etcitty, Legislative
173
Counsel for the Navajo Nation, has argued.
III. SEX-BASED DISTINCTIONS UNDER TRIBAL LAW
As might be expected given the vast diversity tribal cultures, although a significant portion of tribes have prohibitions on sex
discrimination in place, some tribes continue to make sex-based
distinctions in their laws. Indeed, some of the tribes that have
enacted context-specific prohibitions on sex discrimination make sex174
based distinctions in other contexts.
One of the most well-known of tribal laws that makes sex-based
distinctions is the membership rule for Santa Clara Pueblo, which has
175
been reported to be still in place. Although most membership
provisions appear to be sex-neutral, I identified one additional sex176
based enrollment law that favors women and one that appears to
limit the rights of unmarried fathers with respect to their children’s
177
178
eligibility for membership. With a few exceptions, most other sex173. See Krakoff, supra note 8, at 1153 (quoting Navajo Nation Legislative Counsel
Raymond Etcitty).
174. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
175. Valencia-Weber, supra note 14, at 50.
176. CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE KILAGEE TRIBAL TOWN OKLAHOMA, art. III,
§§ 3–5, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/Kialegee_const.htm
(allowing children of female members to automatically become members but
requiring case-by-case approval for children of male members whose mothers are
from other tribes). Sex-neutral enrollment provisions include those of the Citizen
Potawatomi Nation and the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, among others. See,
e.g., CONSTITUTION OF THE CITIZEN POTAWATOMI NATION, art. III, § 1, available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/potawatomi_nation_const.htm;
REVISED CONSTITUTION & BYLAWS OF THE MISSISSIPPI BAND OF CHOCTAW INDIANS, art. III,
§ 1, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/mississippi_
choctaw_const.htm. For a discussion of other sex-based membership provisions, see
Rusco, supra note 100, at 284. However, the Hopi provision that Rusco discusses does
not remain in force. See CONSTITUTION & BY-LAWS OF THE HOPI TRIBE, art. II, § 2
(1993), available at http://hopicourts.com/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=
50&group=13; Personal Communication with Hopi Tribal Secretary’s Office, Oct. 1,
2008 (regarding most recent amendment of the Hopi Constitution).
177. FORT PECK COMPREHENSIVE CODE OF JUSTICE 2000, tit. IV, § 202, Group 4,
available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/fortpeck_justicecode_4
.htm. A somewhat similar provision of federal immigration law was upheld in Nguyen
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based laws that were identified pertained to the family law context,

179

v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
Additionally, I identified one sex-based voting provision but have serious
doubts about whether it remains in force. CONSTITUTION FOR THE ISLETA PUEBLO, art.
II, ¶ 2, available at http://thorpe.ou.edu/IRA/isnmcons.html. This Constitution is
dated 1947, id., although other information indicates this Tribe’s constitution was
revised in 1991. See, e.g., Center for Legal Education, State Bar of New Mexico Indian
Law Section, Tribal Justice & Court Systems, “Pueblo of Isleta Appellate Court &
Tribal Court” 3 (2006), available at http://tlj.unm.edu/handbook/pdfs/
isleta2006.pdf. Indeed, Rusco discusses the Isleta Pueblo Constitution in parts of his
article but does not mention the Tribe in his discussion of tribal sex discrimination.
Rusco, supra note 100, at 273, 284.
178. BLACKFEET TRIBAL LAW & ORDER CODE, ch. 6, § 14(1), available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/blkftcode6enforce.htm (allowing
tribal police officers to command the assistance of males over eighteen years old);
BLACKFEET TRIBAL LAW & ORDER CODE, ch. 2, § 7, available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/blkftcode2civil.htm (allowing for
imprisonment of only male debtors in cases of fraud, potential abscondment, or
removal or concealment of property); MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT TRIBAL LAWS ANN., 24
M.P.T.L. ch. 8, § 7(d) (2008) (providing, under the Mashantucket Pequot Uniform
Gifts to Minors Act, for the default custodian of the minor in certain circumstances to
be the child’s father, unless the parents are divorced and the mother has been
awarded custody, in which case the mother becomes the default custodian); OGLALA
SIOUX LAW & ORDER CODE, ch. 9, § 64 (making it a criminal offense for a man to have
sex with an unmarried woman if she becomes pregnant and gives birth), § 103
(defining the victim of the crime of assault with intent to commit rape as “female”),
§ 104, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/oglala_lawand
order9.htm (making it a crime for “any Indian” to have sex with a female under the
age of sixteen); SAN ILDEFONSO PUEBLO TRIBAL CODE, ch. 31, § 31.2(10), available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/sanildefonso_pueblo_tribalcode.htm
(providing that heirlooms and other articles descend down the maternal line to
female relatives and down the paternal line to male relatives); WHITE MOUNTAIN
APACHE PROBATE CODE, ch. 4, § 4.11(A), available at http://www.tribalresource
center.org/ccfolder1/wht_mtn_apache_tribalcode_probate.html (providing that only
fathers of legitimate children (with consent of the mother) and mothers of
illegitimate children, or one parent alone if the other is incapable of consent, have
the right to appoint testamentary guardians); see also Riggs v. Estate of Attakai, No. SCCV-39-04 (Navajo June 13, 2007), slip op. at 3–4, 4 n.5, available at
http://www.navajocourts.org/NNCourtOpinions2007/09Sista%20Riggs%20v%20E
state%20of%20Tom%20Attakai.pdf (explaining that the tradition of prized grazing
rights descending to female relatives should be part of the analysis in determining
who should be awarded such rights in individual cases).
179. See, e.g., LAW & ORDER CODE OF THE FORT MCDOWELL YAVAPAI COMMUNITY,
ARIZONA, art. III, § 10-34(a)(1)(d), available at http://www.tribalresource
center.org/ccfolder1/yavapai_ftmcdowell_lawandorder10.htm (providing with
regard to parental consent to adoption of a child that “[c]onsent is not necessary
from a father who is not married to the mother of the child both at the time of its
conception and at the time, of its birth, unless the father under oath has
acknowledged [parentage] in a document filed with the court at or prior to the time
the petition for adoption is filed, or unless the parentage of the father has been
previously established by judicial proceedings”); OGLALA SIOUX LAW & ORDER CODE,
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an area where sex-based distinctions have been, and to some extent
180
continue to be, common in American law.
Two of the most interesting sex-based laws relate to traditional
tribal governmental functions. The Constitution of the Iroquois
Nations: The Great Binding Law, Gayanashagowa, sets out male and
181
female roles in the traditional government. One section provides
that a Lord who oversteps his rightful authority will be dismissed after
repeated warnings, and “[h]is nation shall then install the candidate
182
nominated by the female name holders of his family.”
Another law that appears to codify tribal tradition is an alternative dispute resolution provision of the Little River Band of Ottawa
Indians, which utilizes a “Peacemaking System” “to provide a
traditional conflict resolution process to children, youth and fami183
This law provides that “[p]eacemaking sessions are conlies.”
ducted by two Peacemakers: one male and one female to create
184
balance.”
ch. 3, § 30, ¶¶ 2–3, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/
oglala_lawandorder3.htm (providing for females to be able to consent to marriage at
an earlier age than males and providing that males will be considered minors, and
therefore entitled to some parental support, until they are twenty-one, whereas
females will only be considered minors until the age of eighteen); THE LAW & ORDER
CODE OF THE UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY RESERVATION UTAH, tit. V, ch.
III, § 5-3-9, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/ute_ lawand
order.htm (creating presumption in custody proceedings that the mother is best
suited to custody of the children).
180. See, e.g., Ex parte Devine, 398 So.2d 686 (Ala. 1981) (striking down presumption in favor of mother’s custody under equal protection clause); Gordon v. Gordon,
577 P.2d 1271 (Okla. 1978) (upholding presumption in favor of mother’s custody
against equal protection challenge). Note also that the U.S. Supreme Court
continues to uphold laws treating unmarried fathers less favorably than unmarried
mothers. Nguyen, 533 U.S. 53 (upholding the validity of federal distinctions between
unmarried mothers and unmarried fathers that affect a child’s ability to benefit from
the parent’s immigration status in order to gain admittance to the United States).
181. CONSTITUTION OF THE IROQUOIS NATIONS: THE GREAT BINDING LAW,
GAYANASHAGOWA, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/
iroquois_const.htm.
182. Id. § 25; see also Valencia-Weber, supra note 14, at 56 (discussing the
allocation of authority between males and females and the primacy of women in the
clan system of the Onondaga of New York, one of the Nations that comprises the
Iroquois Confederacy); Onondaga Nation, http://www.onondaganation.org/.
183. LITTLE RIVER BAND OF OTTAWA INDIANS ORDINANCES AND REGULATIONS, GDA
DWENDAAGNANANIK: PEACEMAKING GUIDELINES, §§ 1–2, available at http://www
.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/littleriver_ottawa_ordandreg.htm.
184. Id. § 3. Notably, a Washington state case has upheld such legally-mandated
sex-balancing in the composition of the Washington State Democratic Committee
against a state constitutional challenge based on Washington’s Equal Rights
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Both the Little River Band of Ottawa Indians’ law and the Constitution of the Iroquois Nations appear to be integral to preserving
those tribes’ unique traditions. While some tribal laws make sex-based
distinctions that may be troubling to other Americans, it is hard to
fathom the degree to which tribal cultures would be compromised if
185
such distinctions were outlawed.
IV. TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
It is very possible that tribal sovereign immunity could impede a
plaintiff’s ability to enforce equal protection guarantees or tribal
prohibitions on sex discrimination or to challenge a law creating a
sex-based distinction. Therefore, a brief discussion of the doctrine is
warranted here. Under the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity,
186
tribes, like other sovereigns, are immune from suit in state, federal,
and tribal courts, although either the tribe or the federal government
187
may expressly waive this immunity.
However, most tribes will permit ICRA suits in which only equita188
ble relief is sought to be brought against them in tribal court.
Other civil rights claims based on the tribal constitution or a statutory

Amendment. Machioro v. Chaney, 582 P.2d 487, 490–92 (Wash. 1978).
185. See, e.g., Valencia-Weber, supra note 14, at 53–56.
186. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (addressing state sovereign
immunity).
187. See, e.g., COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 7.05 (2007).
188. Taylor, supra note 43, at 253–55; see also Dupree v. Cheyenne River Sioux
Hous. Auth., 16 Indian L. Rptr. 6106, 6108 (Cheyenne River Sioux Ct. App.1988);
McCallister v. Spirit Mountain Gaming, 33 Indian L. Rptr. 6057, 6061 (Confederated
Tribes of the Grand Ronde Community Tribal Ct. 2007); Healy v. Mashantucket
Pequot Gaming Enter., 26 Indian L. Rptr. 6189, 6191 (Mashantucket Ct. of App.
1999); Jackson v. Kahgegab, 33 Indian L. Rptr. 6105, 6108 (Saginaw Chippewa Indian
Tribe App. Ct. 2003); see also DeCoteau v. Ft. Peck Tribes, __ Am. Tribal L. __, 2002
WL 34432659, *5, *7 (Ft. Peck. Ct. of App., Dec. 5, 2002) (holding that ICRA claims
for equitable and injunctive relief may be brought against tribal officials and tribal
employees but imposing heightened pleading requirements); accord Rosen, supra note
23, at 509 (explaining that ICRA suits for prospective injunctive relief are usually
allowed but that allowance of such suits does not technically constitute a waiver of
tribal sovereign immunity); cf. Thomas v. Coquille Indian Tribe, No. C03-001,
2004.NACQ.0000001, ¶¶ 77–78 (Coquille Indian Tribal Court, March 9, 2004),
available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/opinions/opfolder/2004.NACQ
.0000001.htm (noting that neither the ICRA nor the tribal constitution “create[s]
remedies in this tribal court for denial of due process or equal protection” but that,
because the plaintiff failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted,
“[w]hether such remedies exist . . . is an issue to be resolved, if at all, on another
day”).
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bill of rights also appear to be permitted fairly commonly when only
189
However, more difficult issues tend to
equitable relief is sought.
arise when a plaintiff seeks to sue under an ordinary tribal code
provision. It appears that many tribes have enacted narrow waivers for
specific types of such claims, and thus tight filing deadlines and sharp
limitations on the claims that may be pursued and the remedies
190
available should be expected. In some cases, a waiver may not be
191
available at all, although, in rare cases, plaintiffs have convinced
192
tribal councils to create waivers especially for them.
Even if no
waiver is available, however, the policy inherent in law can still serve
important functions and can influence community standards of right
and wrong.
V. OTHER AVENUES OF RELIEF
Despite the fairly widespread existence of tribal sex discrimination laws, case law construing such laws appeared to be largely lacking.
Given the numerous cases regarding employment-related due process
claims, it is possible that plaintiffs who could bring sex discrimination
193
claims are focusing on due process instead. Another possibility is
189. McCallister, 33 Indian L. Rptr. at 6061; Johnson v. Navajo Nation, 14 Indian L.
Rptr. 6037, 6040 (Navajo1987); cf. Thomas, No. C03-001, 2004.NACQ.0000001 at ¶¶
77–78, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/opinions/opfolder/2004
.NACQ.0000001.htm (noting that neither the ICRA nor the tribal constitution
“create[s] remedies in this tribal court for denial of due process or equal protection”
but that, because the plaintiff failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted,
“[w]hether such remedies exist . . . is an issue to be resolved, if at all, on another
day”).
190. McCallister, 33 Indian L. Rptr. at 6058–59; Beebe v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 32
Indian L. Rptr. 6155, 6156 (Ho-Chunk Nation Sup. Ct., July 18, 2005); Schock v.
Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enterprise, 3 Mashantucket Rptr. 129, 1999 WL
34828705 (Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct., Sept. 20, 1999); Bethel v. Mohegan
Tribal Gaming Authority et al., No. GDTC-T-98-105, 1998.NAMG.0000005 ¶¶ 34–35,
42–43 (Mohegan Gaming Disputes Ct. of App., Dec. 14, 1998), available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/opinions/opfolder/1998.NAMG.0000005.htm;
Long v. Mohegan Tribal Gaming Auth., 25 Indian L. Rptr. 6111, 6112–13 (Mohegan
Gaming Disputes Tribal Ct., Dec. 5, 1997); Renecker v. Tulalip Tribes, No. TUL-EMP11/96-667, 5 Northwest Intertribal Court System App. 1, 4–5 (May 29, 1997);
Chatterson v. Confederated Tribes of the Siletz Nation of Indians of Oregon, 24
Indian L. Rptr. 6231, 6231–32 (Siletz Ct. App., Oct. 9, 1997).
191. See, e.g., Pawnee Tribe of Oklahoma v. Fransen, 19 Indian L. Rptr. 6006 (Ct.
Indian App. 1991).
192. See, e.g., Shippentower v. Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian
Reservation of Oregon, 20 Indian L. Rptr. 6026, 6026–27 (Umatilla Tribal Ct. 1993).
193. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 51, at 293 (noting that “Tribal Courts are
inundated with personnel cases” based on due process claims). For an example of a
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that some tribes may take a broader view of discrimination, not
conceptualizing it to be limited to suspect classes, and, therefore,
plaintiffs may be bringing generic discrimination claims, rather than
194
sex discrimination claims. Undoubtedly, however, a proportion of
potential sex discrimination claims are not heard on the merits due to
plaintiffs’ failure to meet the strict filing deadlines that many tribes
apply to employment discrimination claims or claims against the
195
tribe.
VI. CONCLUSION
There are numerous tribal protections against sex discrimination
in force, ranging from equal protection guarantees, to explicit broadbased constitutional or statutory protections, to context-specific
proscriptions against discrimination that apply in anywhere from fairly
broad to quite narrow contexts. Although it is difficult to generalize,
the wording of several statutory laws and some case law suggests a
greater concern for disparate impact than inheres in federal antidiscrimination law. Moreover, all of these protections evidence tribal
due process case in the employment context, see Lonetree v. Garvin, 34 Indian L.
Rptr. 6126, 6126–27 (Ho-Chunk Nation Sup. Ct. 2007).
194. See, e.g., LITTLE RIVER BAND OF OTTAWA INDIANS ORDINANCES & REGULATIONS,
CH. 600, § 2.2, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/
littleriver_ottawa_ordandreg.htm (prohibiting discrimination based on suspect class
membership or “other non-merit factors”); SUSANVILLE INDIAN RANCHERIA
CONSTITUTION & BYLAWS, BYLAWS, art. III, § 4(6), available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/susanvilleconst.htm (requiring the
Tribal Council to “[c]ommit to providing an environment that is free from
discrimination”); see generally Warner v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 34 Indian L. Rptr. 6084
(Ho-Chunk Nation Sup. Ct. 2007) (addressing the possibility that the plaintiff’s
demotion was a pretext as defined under tribal law without appearing to view the
concept of pretext to necessarily be tied to discrimination based on membership in a
suspect class); see also DiPietro v. Mashantucket Pequot, 34 Indian L. Rptr. 6092
(Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct. 2007) (referring to plaintiff’s disparate treatment
claim without mention of the claim’s being based on membership in a suspect class).
Yet another possibility is that the apparent lack of sex discrimination case law
is a misperception resulting from the general difficulty of obtaining tribal case law
compared to tribal statutory law. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. Although
this difficulty may partially account for the apparent lack of tribal sex discrimination
case law, it is doubtful that this general difficulty in obtaining case law is the only issue
at play.
195. See, e.g., McCallister, 33 Indian L. Rptr. at 6058–59; Bethel v. Mohegan Tribal
Gaming Authority et al., No. GDTC-T-98-105, 1998.NAMG.0000005 ¶¶ 34–35, 42–43
(Mohegan Gaming Disputes Ct. of App., Dec. 14, 1998), available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/opinions/opfolder/1998.NAMG.0000005.htm;
Chatterson, 24 Indian L. Rptr. at 6231–32.
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policies against sex discrimination. However, it is important to be
realistic about the fact that all tribes do not have such protections in
place, and, similarly to the United States, some tribes continue to
make sex-based distinctions (including a few of the tribes that
prohibit sex discrimination in some contexts). Nonetheless, the
diversity of tribal approaches to the issue of sex discrimination and
the breadth of existing legal protections are impressive.
More research is needed to better understand the scope, application, and frequency of these laws. As more tribes begin to make their
laws available outside of their judicial systems, this research will
become more feasible. In the meantime, it is possible to focus in
significant depth on individual tribes that do have codes and case law
that either are available on the tribes’ own websites or by visiting the
tribal courts in person. While obtaining materials in this way is less
196
likely to allow for electronic searching or to facilitate large-scale
comparisons among tribes, it would be a fruitful area of research and
would add significantly to the growing base of scholarship on tribal
law.
One thing that should be clear from existing information is that
tribes collectively do not take a monolithic approach to sex discrimination and that many tribes have made a significant commitment to
eradicating it. Moreover, it should also be apparent that individual
tribes’ laws can, in many circumstances, be located, albeit with some
work.

196. For example, the Hopi Tribal Courts Website, http://hopicourts.com/
index.php?option=com_docman&group=13&Itemid=50, provides access to tribal
statutory and constitutional law, as well as to appellate court decisions dating back to
1984. At least some of the sections of the tribal code appear to be electronically
searchable within each document (e.g., electronic searching is possible within the
Enrollment Code), but the tribal constitution is not electronically searchable.
Similarly, the cases are provided in lists grouped by date and are not electronically
searchable.
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